

# **SPECIAL FORCES INTEGRATION WITH MULTINATIONAL DIVISION-NORTH IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA**

**A MONOGRAPH**

**BY**

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
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
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## **ABSTRACT**

### **Special Forces Integration with Multinational Division-North in Bosnia-Herzegovina**

by Lieutenant Colonel Michael L. Findlay, USA, 67 pages.

The American people expect the military to win future engagements with greater efficiency to reduce costs. Our National Military Strategy, Joint Vision 2010, and other keystone joint publications seek to answer their expectation by espousing 'jointness' - fighting as a fully interoperable and seamlessly integrated joint force. These publications envision achieving increased effectiveness by creating the best fit of available component forces to harmonize the unique and complementary strengths and capabilities of each of our Services.

This monograph examines how well Special Forces and U.S. conventional ground forces in Bosnia satisfied the vision of 'jointness' during both Operations Joint Endeavor and Joint Guard. It adopts a methodology of examining these operations using two criteria that research revealed were common to the documents: service provision of effective component forces and efficient joint employment by the responsible commander. The corresponding measures of merit used to analyze operations are: presence of competent components, fit of forces, command relationships, mission direction, and mutual trust.

After describing the joint and multinational environment in Bosnia, and Special Forces operations in the Multinational Division-North sector, the monograph systematically assesses the 'jointness' of Special Forces operations in the Multinational Division-North sector relative to the measures of merit. Research reveals overall success in operations but significant shortcomings in command relationships and mutual trust that improved only after months of turmoil.

The monograph concludes that complicated and unclear command relationships caused poor mutual trust between Special Forces and conventional forces and degraded overall effectiveness. It questions the utility of the Tactical Control (TACON) command relationship for long term operations, proposing rather an Operational Control (OPCON) or Direct Support relationship based on the requirements of the joint force commander. It also asserts the necessity for special operations expertise imbedded in the joint force commander's staff rather than allowing a subordinate special operations headquarters to provide potentially biased staff recommendations on how special operations forces can assist in the accomplishment of the joint force mission. Finally, the paper makes recommendations to improve current doctrine and future operations.

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## **Chapter 1. Introduction**

### **Section I. Overview**

This monograph investigates the state of integration between Army conventional forces and Special Forces during a peacetime operation, Bosnia. It assesses whether Special Forces (SF) operations in the Multinational Division - North (MND-N) sector in Bosnia conform to the "jointness" vision espoused in current U.S. military strategy and vision documents.\* The monograph brings out both good and bad teamwork and its effect on overall mission accomplishment, and ends with recommendations. Chapter 2 develops the evaluation criteria used in this assessment. These criteria are derived from U.S. National Military Strategy, Joint Vision 2010, SOF Vision 2020, and other supporting documents.

Chapter 3 then describes the joint and multinational environment in Bosnia, laying out the NATO, MND-N, and Joint Military Commission (JMC) operations. This is the joint and multinational environment in which SF supported joint, multinational, and the U.S. MND-N commanders.

Chapter 4 reviews Special Forces operations in MND-N. The chapter examines several subject areas. It describes chronologically the overall concept of Special Forces support, from its inception, supporting the joint force commander, to its shift toward support of MND commanders. Within this framework, the chapter addresses the Joint Commission Observers (JCOs) - SF personnel who assisted NATO force interaction with the Former Warfighting Factions (FWF). It also describes the role of SF Liaison Coordination Elements (LCEs) who facilitated initial interoperability with several non-NATO multinational forces early in the operation before conventional force commanders were able to fully establish their liaison teams.

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\* With the passage of the Nunn-Cohen Amendment and the development of U.S. Special Operations Command, most military personnel describe conventional units working with Special Forces as joint operations.

Two major command and control areas are also addressed: command relationships of Special Forces in the MND-N sector, and the Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE) that was colocated with MND-N.

Chapter 5 then examines these Special Forces operations and their relationship with MND-N in terms of the “jointness” criteria developed earlier. The chapter is contentious. It contains blunt viewpoints from both conventional and Special Forces soldiers on integration problems and their effects on coherent operations. It brings out command relationship issues, and initial weaknesses in trust and effectiveness that were overcome only through strong leadership and a long maturation process of both the SF and conventional forces. And it poses other questions. Did we “wring every ounce of capability from every available source to retain effectiveness with less redundancy,” as Joint Vision 2010 challenges?<sup>1</sup> Did we create efficient command and control structures responsive to everyone’s needs? Was there clear direction in terms of a campaign and what we wanted from the Special Forces units?

The monograph concludes with a summary of the assessment and recommendations on improving coherent joint operations of special forces with conventional ground forces.

## Section II. Limitations

Several limitations in scope are necessary to allow focus on the primary question - SF and MND-N jointness. First, the monograph is limited to examination of SF integration in the MND-N sector from December 1995 to November 1997. The subject of SF support to the *joint force commander (JFC)* (i.e. COMIFOR / COMSFOR) is too broad a topic for this paper, despite the JFC’s role as principal decisionmaker on the proper employment of special forces in support of assigned missions. However, some of the issues identified later in the monograph can be traced back to decisions (or lack of) at the joint force level. These decisions directly effected MND operations and are discussed in the assessment.

Second, the focus on support to MND-N also restricts the analysis to one of SF supporting a higher U.S. headquarters (MND-N), and does not support to a French (MND-SE) or United Kingdom (MND-SW) multinational headquarters. This restriction of view to SF integration with a U.S. conventional force permits a more focused analysis using the criteria developed from U.S. strategy and vision documents. Many of the conclusions about command relationship resulting from this U.S. to U.S. analysis may not be applicable to command relationships in a multinational environment.

Third, the monograph is unclassified, focusing on JCO and LCE activities, and does not address classified missions and operations, nor foreign SOF, other than a brief unclassified overview of the British JCO operations during IFOR. Additionally, it does not go into great detail on specific JCO target audiences as the mission is ongoing and many of these operations are sensitive.

Fourth, the monograph does not dwell on the Humanitarian Demining Operations (HDO) training SF provided in Bosnia.<sup>2</sup> While very important to the long term safety and livelihood of the population, this operation did not impact directly on the day-to-day operations of MND-N.<sup>3</sup>

Finally, the monograph remains focused on SF operations only. Other Special Operations Forces (SOF), such as Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations (PSYOP), are not discussed. However, many sources recommended a study into the command relationships and organization of these CA and PSYOP forces, and the degree of increased decentralization needed to ensure responsive PSYOP support to the ground commander.

## Chapter 2. Assessment Criteria

### Section I. General

How does one assess whether one force effectively supported another force? There are many possible criteria, both quantitative and qualitative. Among the possibilities are: *personal assessments* by the supported and supporting units; *number of missions accomplished*; and the *overall success of the supported commander*. Most of these can be dismissed due to lack of any direct correlation of supporting force worth to conclusive result. For example, *personal assessments* of effectiveness are normally biased by the position and viewpoint of the individual. The *number of missions* a force accomplishes may have no bearing on overall mission success. In many cases, a few well executed missions have more value than many executed poorly. Indeed, some missions may provide no direct benefit to the supported commander's success at all. Likewise, assessing effectiveness of support based on the supported force's *mission success or failure* is hardly conclusive. Success or failure may be the result of actions very different than those performed by the supporting force.

Rather than attempting to assess SF support to MND-N by the above criteria, this monograph uses others derived from attributes of relevant performance laid out in U.S. National Military Strategy, Joint Vision documents, and joint doctrine. A prominent force attribute, "Jointness," derived from the National Military Strategy of 1997, serves as the basis for development of two criteria -- component effectiveness and efficient joint employment. Five measures of merit are used to assist in the assessment of a coherent joint force. (figure 1) these are competence, fit, clear command and control, competent direction, and presence of mutual trust.

These criteria and measures of merit are identified and discussed in the next two sections. Additionally, key authorities and responsibilities inherent in various command and support relationships are outlined.




Figure 1 - A Coherent Joint Force

## Section II. Jointness - A Review of Literature

The U.S. National Military Strategy of 1997 identifies the requirement for both *competent components* and *efficient joint employment* stating, "Our forces must be proficient in their core warfighting competencies... and must be ready to fight as a coherent joint force – fully interoperable and seamlessly integrated."<sup>4</sup> It continues "on most occasions, our forces will operate as a joint team, harmonizing the unique and complementary strengths and capabilities of each of our Services... While retaining unilateral capability, whenever possible we must seek to operate alongside alliance or coalition forces, integrating their capabilities and capitalizing on their strengths."<sup>5</sup>

Joint Vision 2010 continues this theme of the necessity for a competent joint force "focusing the strengths of each individual service."<sup>6</sup> It states that

"the American people will continue to expect us to win in any engagement, but they will also expect us to be more efficient... Commanders will be expected to reduce costs... We will need to wring every ounce of capability from every source. That outcome can only be accomplished through a more seamless integration of Service capabilities... we must be fully joint. Future commanders must be able to *visualize and create the "best fit" of available forces... to achieve desired results.*"<sup>7</sup>

Joint Publication 3.0, the keystone document for joint operations, reemphasizes that to have a competent joint force you must first have *competent components*, skilled in their roles and missions. It then continues, stating that the goal of creating the best fit is to “increase the total effectiveness of the joint force...”<sup>8</sup> In addition to creating the right mix of forces, Joint Vision 2010 challenges the armed forces to “*examine the traditional criteria governing span of control and organizational layers* for the Services, Commands, and Defense agencies. We need organizations and processes that are *agile enough to exploit... and respond ...*”<sup>9</sup> Joint Vision 2010 goes on to comment on multinational operations, observing, “Our history, strategy, and recent experience suggest we usually work in concert with our friends and allies in almost all operations.”<sup>10</sup> So “it is not enough to be joint,... we must find the most effective methods for integrating and improving interoperability with allied and coalition partners.”<sup>11</sup>

Special Operations Forces (SOF), and in particular, Special Forces have a valuable role in supporting our military strategy within this vision. Former CINCSOC, General (retired) Wayne Downing, is widely heralded as the leading proponent for changing SOF’s mindset from only conducting unilateral operations toward more open integration with the conventional forces. He states in USSOCOM Publication 1 that, “SOF can reinforce, augment, and complement conventional forces before, during, and after any conflict, heightening the effectiveness of the total military effort.”<sup>12</sup> General Peter Schoomaker, current CINCSOC, has also articulated his vision for SOF integration with conventional forces in Special Operations Forces: The Way Ahead. Speaking of Special Forces, he reinforces the joint and multinational value of SF stating “SOF conduct ... missions that directly or indirectly support the joint force commander’s campaign plan. Fully integrated... SOF can provide advisory and liaison capabilities to rapidly integrate coalition partners and leverage their unique qualities to enhance the capabilities of the entire force.”<sup>13</sup>

The USSOCOM director of Plans, Policy and Doctrine, RADM Thomas Steffans, follows up on this vision of SF supporting the conventional commanders. He stated in a December 1997 briefing that SOF operates in the "Whole Battle Area - rear, close, and deep."<sup>14</sup> This "whole battle area" vision of SOF employment infers an integrated command and control structure that allows SOF to be responsive to the respective "battle area" commanders. The Final Coordination Draft of Joint Publication 3-05 carries on this theme of SOF operating alongside conventional forces stating, "SOF can operate independently or in conjunction with conventional forces. SOF can complement and reinforce conventional forces..."<sup>15</sup> It states further "SOF may be under the OPCON or TACON of Service or functional component commanders. Specific command arrangements should be determined by the nature of the mission and the objectives to be accomplished."<sup>16</sup>

SOF vision and doctrine agree with and advance the requirements laid out in U.S. national military strategy and joint vision for "jointness" in the Armed Forces. Additionally, all of the above SOF documents identify the requirement for competent special operations forces as a prerequisite for successful operations.

### Section III. Criteria and Measures of Merit

The two key attributes of a coherent joint force are effective component forces and efficient joint employment. Component effectiveness is defined here as: *component competence in executing individual and unit tasks*. These individual and unit tasks are the building blocks that the joint force commander pieces together to accomplish a mission. Component effectiveness is clearly a prerequisite for efficient joint direction. The JFC, and indeed each component, must trust that the component building blocks are competent in their respective roles and missions prior to piecing them together to conduct operations.

Efficient joint employment entails the proper integration of these component forces' "building blocks" to optimize their contributions. Benefit to the overall force's mission is the motivator. Service parochialism is not.

The foundation for the proper integration of these *competent* building blocks is trust – defined in joint doctrine as "total confidence in the integrity, ability, and good character of another."<sup>17</sup> Joint Publication 1 states that trust has often been singled out by key members of the most effective US joint forces "as a dominant characteristic of their teams."<sup>18</sup> It states the basis of trust in developing teamwork:

"Trust does not result from good feelings or devout wishes but is based on the mutual confidence resulting from honest efforts to learn about and understand the capabilities each member brings to the team."<sup>19</sup>


In addition to confidence in each others' abilities, the forces must also trust that the other force cares about them, that they will be "there" when they need them. Both must trust that the others' motivation is toward overall mission accomplishment without service parochialism or bias.

Mutual trust is that trust established between two elements. In a typical hierarchical military relationship, the commander trusts that the subordinate will obey orders and do everything possible to ensure the higher command's success. Because of this trust in subordinates, the higher commander can "wring every ounce of capability from every source" and "visualize and create the best fit" of his forces to accomplish the mission. As JCS Pub 1 states, "Trust expands the commander's options and enhances flexibility, agility, and freedom to take the initiative when conditions warrant."<sup>20</sup> Likewise, the subordinate trusts that the commander cares about his safety and will properly employ him without being subject to undue risk. Subordinate commanders who *gain* other components' forces resulting from the joint force commander's *fitting* of forces require the same degree of trust in and by their *new* subordinates.

At subordinate levels, such as that of MND-N in Bosnia, trust between forces is partly dependent on the earlier decisions by the joint force commander on the *fit of forces*, and the degree of *command authority* and *competence in mission direction* provided. If a subordinate commander is not given appropriate authority over supporting forces, commensurate with his responsibility for operations, he may not be able to trust in their absolute support of his mission.

Continuing, if the subordinate commander is not competent in employing these supporting forces, he may likely lose their

trust. Depending on the degree of performance of the other measures of merit, these deficiencies may result in incoherent operations.



**Figure 2 - Assessment criteria and measures of merit**

*Efficient* fit of forces through tailored task organizations, mission statements, and command relationships, is developed by the joint commander within this environment of mutual trust. The best suited force is matched against the pertinent task. The building blocks of component effectiveness are built into a lean, architecturally efficient structure. Components rely on the directed “fit of other component forces” to do those things they do best and do not feel the need to deploy a Service “redundant capability” to guard against a sister component opting out of doing its ‘part.’<sup>21</sup> The joint commanders can then give mission type orders to his subordinates expecting them to best employ all of the provided *building blocks* in accomplishment of the mission.

*Command relationships* that provide clear authority and responsibility to the commander responsible for mission accomplishment are established by the higher commander in direct

correlation with concept of operations, rather than along strictly service lines. Component forces work confidently for whichever commander has the mission, trusting that the commander will employ them correctly and judiciously.

Command relationships state the degree of control and responsibility a commander has for forces operating under his command.<sup>22</sup> There are four command and support relationships recognized in current doctrine that could have applicability to special forces operations in a division sector much like that in Bosnia. These are Operational Control (OPCON), Tactical Control (TACON), General Support (GS), and Direct Support (DS). Two NATO terms are also relevant: Tactical Command (NATO TACOM) and Tactical Control (NATO TACON). These relationships are defined below and graphically portrayed in figure 3.

**“OPCON** is defined as the “command authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission.”

**TACON** is the “command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.”

**Direct Support** is a mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly the supported force's request for assistance.

**General support** is that support which is given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof.

**NATO TACOM** is the authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority.

**NATO TACON** is the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.”<sup>23</sup> Note that in NATO TACON there is no delegated command authority.

The remaining factor in ensuring efficient joint employment is *proper direction*. The designated commanders of the building blocks must be able to provide proper mission direction that enables mission accomplishment with minimum risk to the force. Therefore, they, or members of their staff, must be knowledgeable of their *building blocks'* capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses, and how to properly employ them.

Multinational effectiveness and efficiency can be viewed in the same manner as joint effectiveness and efficiency. However, in multinational operations U.S. commanders don't have control over the competence of the "building blocks" The force composition, doctrine, and capabilities of our multinational partners may be far different than those of our own defense establishment. Nor will command relationships be as authoritative. Also, most multinational operations will be more ad hoc, requiring rapid assimilation of forces. This entails a rapid development of trust and confidence among the multinational forces. Confidence in knowing the capabilities of the "building blocks" and trust in a shared vision focused on mission accomplishment remain essential.

Relationship	Attached	OPCON	TACON	NATO TACOM	NATO TACON	GS	DS
Has command Relationship with:	Gaining Unit	Gaining Unit	Gaining Unit	Gaining Unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit
Assigns Tasks	Gaining Unit	Gaining Unit	Parent unit	Gaining Unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit
May be Task Organized by:	Gaining Unit	Gaining Unit (U.S.)	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit
Receives Logistics support from:	Gaining Unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit
Is positioned by:	Gaining Unit	Gaining Unit	Gaining Unit (Maneuver)	Gaining Unit <sup>24</sup> (Maneuver)	Gaining Unit <sup>24</sup> (Maneuver)	Parent unit	Supported Unit
Provides Liaison:	As reqd by unit to which attached	As reqd by unit having OPCON	As reqd by unit having TACON	As reqd by unit having NATO TACOM	As reqd by unit having NATO TACON	As required by Parent unit	Supported Unit
Establishes / Maintains Communications with:	Unit to which attached	Parent unit and unit having OPCON	Parent unit and unit having TACON	Parent unit and unit having TACOM	Parent unit and unit having NATO TACON	Parent unit	Parent unit and Supported Unit
Has Priorities Established by:	Gaining Unit	Gaining Unit	Gaining Unit	Gaining Unit	Gaining Unit	Parent unit	Supported Unit
Gaining unit can further impose Command Relationships of:	Attached, OPCON, TACON, GS, DS	OPCON, TACON, GS, DS	GS, DS	NA	NA	NA	NA
Anticipated Time Duration	Long Term	Long or Short Term	Short Term	Long or Short Term	Short Term	Long or Short Term	Long or Short Term
Responsible for <sup>24</sup> Force Protection	Gaining Unit	Gaining Unit	Parent Unit	Parent and Gaining Unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit

**Figure 3 - Command and Support Relationships and inherent responsibilities<sup>25</sup>**

\* Author inclusion per discussion with the TRADOC OPR (CDD) and the referenced SSI Study.

#### Section IV. Conclusion

These concepts of component effectiveness and efficient joint employment with their 5 measures of merit are the criteria for the assessment of SF support to MND-N. The following chapters describe and assess the degree of "jointness" in the SF and MND-N operations, leading to the conclusion and recommendations.

## Chapter 3. Background

### Section I. NATO Operations

On 14 December 1995 the Bosnia Peace Agreement negotiated in Dayton, Ohio, was signed in Paris. Based on UN Security Council Resolution 1031, NATO was given the mandate to implement the military aspects of the Peace Agreement.<sup>26</sup> On 16 December, NATO commenced implementation of this mandate in a series of actions named Operation Joint Endeavor. The NATO-led multinational force, called the Implementation Force (IFOR), started its mission on 20 December 1995.<sup>27</sup>





Figure 4 - IFOR Deployment<sup>28</sup>

Operation Joint Endeavor fell under the political direction and control of the Alliance's North Atlantic Council. IFOR had a unified command structure with overall military authority exercised by NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General George Joulwan. General Joulwan designated Admiral Leighton-Smith (NATO's Commander in Chief Southern

Command - CINCSOUTH) as the first Commander of IFOR (COMIFOR).<sup>\*</sup> IFOR exercised command of ground operations through the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), a predominantly British NATO headquarters.<sup>29</sup> In November 1996, IFOR Headquarters was transferred from AFSOUTH to LANDCENT. General William Crouch, CINCLANDCENT, subsequently assumed command of IFOR.



**Figure 5 - IFOR Command Structure<sup>30</sup>**

IFOR exercised command of special operations through a Special Operations Command - IFOR (SOCIFOR) commanded by the Commander of Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR), U.S. BG Canavan. SOCIFOR established a Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) subordinate to the ARRC for the conduct of special operations in Bosnia. This CJSOTF was initially commanded by British Brigadier Cedric Delves.<sup>31</sup>

IFOR's primary mission was to implement the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement. It maintained the cessation of hostilities; separated the armed forces of the Bosnian-Croat Entity (the Federation) and the Bosnian Serb Entity by mid-January 1996; transferred

<sup>\*</sup> Admiral Joseph Lopez succeeded ADM Smith as CINCSOUTH Jul 96 and assumed COMIFOR.

contested areas between the entities by mid March; and moved the Parties' forces and heavy weapons into approved sites by June 1996.<sup>32</sup>


After the September 1996 elections, and in anticipation of the expiration of the stated time period for IFOR, NATO organized a subsequent force to stabilize the peace. This stabilization operation was named "Joint Guard," and the Stabilization Force (SFOR) was activated on 20

December 1996. Under UN Security Council


Resolution 1088 of 12 December 1996, SFOR continued to implement the military aspects of the Peace Agreement.<sup>34</sup> SFOR acts today with the primary mission to contribute to the secure environment necessary for the consolidation of peace.<sup>35</sup>

The Stabilization Force remains NATO-led. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General Wesley Clark, who became SACEUR 11 July 97, has overall military authority. CINCLANDCENT remains the Commander of SFOR (COMSFOR).<sup>37</sup> On 30 July 1997, General Eric Shinseki assumed command of LANDCENT relieving General William Crouch. As COMSFOR, he directly commands the three multinational divisions in Bosnia versus exercising command as did IFOR through a Land Component Commander (the ARRC).

The SOCIFOR was disestablished under SFOR. The CJSOTF, previously subordinate to the ARRC became



**Figure 6 - SFOR Structure<sup>33</sup>**



**Figure 7 - SFOR SOF Structure<sup>36</sup>  
(NATO Command Relationships)**

subordinate directly to COMSFOR and remains responsible for all special operations in Bosnia.<sup>38</sup> The CJSOTF retains NATO OPCON of all SF in Bosnia. It has delegated NATO TACON of the MND SOCCEs to the MND commanders.

SFOR remains a joint and multinational force. Every NATO nation with armed forces has troops in SFOR. All 18 non-NATO nations that participated in IFOR continue participation in SFOR. Slovenia and Ireland have also joined SFOR, bringing the total of non-NATO participating nations to 20.<sup>39</sup> These non-NATO nations continue to support SFOR on the same basis as forces from NATO. They take orders from the SFOR Commander through the respective multinational divisional headquarters (MND-N, MND-SE, and MND-SW). They also have liaison officers at SHAPE to plan operations and coordinate the necessary forces through the SFOR Coordination Center. Of note, Russian forces joined IFOR in January 1996 and also continue support with SFOR. The Russian contingent is directly subordinate to a Russian officer, who functions as SACEUR's deputy. In Bosnia, the Russian brigade remains under the NATO TACON of the US-led MND-N.<sup>40</sup>

## Section II. Multinational Division - North

The United States provides the headquarters for the MND-N. Designated as Task Force Eagle (TF Eagle) under IFOR, the 1<sup>st</sup> Armored division (1<sup>st</sup> AD), commanded by MG William Nash, assumed control of its area of responsibility during a Transfer Of Authority ceremony with United Nations forces at Eagle Base, Tuzla on 20 December, 1995.<sup>41</sup>

During IFOR, TF Eagle was comprised of the 1<sup>st</sup> AD, together with Nordic-Polish, Turkish, and Russian brigades, with forces from 11 nations: Estonia, Latvia, Finland, Poland, Denmark, Lithuania, Norway, Iceland, Sweden, Russia, and Turkey, and supporting forces from V U.S. Corps.

The CJSOTF supported MND-N with British Joint Commission Observers (JCO) and U.S. liaison coordination elements (LCE). The British JCOs, while remaining under CJSOTF

control, gave MND-N direct communications and access to factional elements in his sector. The U.S. LCEs, gave MND-N initial communications with his subordinate multinational forces and assisted their integration into TF Eagle. This LCE liaison mission and presence rapidly downsized as MND commanders established their own organic liaison capabilities with subordinate non-US forces. These JCO and LCE units, their command and control headquarters, and missions are discussed further in chapter 4 along with a more detailed description of command relationships.


On 10 November, 1996, The 1<sup>st</sup> AD transferred authority for command and control of TF Eagle to the 1st Infantry Division (1<sup>st</sup> ID), commanded by MG Montgomery Meigs. Elements of 1<sup>st</sup> ID had deployed to Bosnia earlier as a covering force to support the safe redeployment of 1<sup>st</sup> AD units to Germany. Upon completion of the covering force mission, it remained in Bosnia performing the Military Aspects Of The Dayton Peace Agreement. On 20 December 1996, the 1<sup>st</sup> ID became part of the newly established SFOR. Eight months later, on 7 August 1997, MG Meigs passed command of the 1<sup>st</sup> ID (and MND-N) to MG David Grange. More recently, on 22 October 1997, The 1<sup>st</sup> AD, now under the command of MG Larry Ellis, returned to Bosnia and relieved the 1<sup>st</sup> ID, reassuming command of MND-N.

Special operations support to MND-N also changed during the transition from IFOR to SFOR. As stated earlier, the IFOR, British led, CJSOTF became U.S. led under SFOR, and the JCO mission was also passed off to U.S. Special Forces. Thus during SFOR, MND-N and SF integration has been one of U.S. to U.S. integration without the added complexity of multinational control. The description and assessment of SF and MND-N integration in chapters 3 and 4 focus largely on this SFOR time period.

### Section III. The Joint Military Commission (JMC)

Even before the Dayton meetings in 1995, NATO planners were discussing how military enforcers of a peace plan could best interact with the factional leaders in Bosnia to establish and maintain a secure environment. In 1993, planners at the ARRC analyzed the Geneva (Stoltenberg-Owen) Peace Plan and concluded some form of political interaction between UN or NATO commanders and representatives of the Bosnian factions was essential to success in any peace agreement.<sup>43</sup> Thus, when the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP)<sup>44</sup> was signed on 14 December 1995 it included specific language on how this interaction would occur. Annex 1 of the GFAP defined the Parties' agreed-upon military responsibilities, NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR) mandate rights and roles, and formally created the JMC process as a forum through which factions could coordinate operations. It was also the mechanism by which instructions were issued and entity disputes were arbitrated.<sup>45</sup>

On 15 December 1995, COMIFOR issued a Statement of Procedures that defined the JMC process authorized in the GFAP, and further defined the implied military tasks. This Statement of Procedures established the JMC as the central



**Figure 8 - ARRC JMC<sup>42</sup>**

body for military factions to coordinate and resolve problems as was envisioned in the GFAP. COMIFOR delegated routine JMC chairmanship to COMARRC who issued instructions to ensure the Parties' compliance with the military aspects of GFAP. Below the COMARRC level, the multinational divisions, their subordinate brigades, and battalions also established military commissions.<sup>46</sup>

At the division level, the JMC was the key link to the parties. At MND-N, the "JMC" was both an organization, shown in figure 9, and a meeting apparatus shown in figure 10. The division level organization was headed by a U.S. Colonel. At brigade and battalion it was a

process by which the commanders met with and resolved issues with the FWF.<sup>49</sup> The JMC, then, was a "command mechanism through which instructions were given, and procedures established for supervision, monitoring, and verification of the actions of the factions."<sup>50</sup>

During IFOR, MG Nash directed the JMC to:

- "Advise on JMC procedures, political, and military problems related to treaty compliance and likely impact on TF Eagle's military operations.
- Integrate and coordinate JMC issues with TF Eagle primary staff sections for fusion of information and application to military operations.
- Command and control Joint Commission Observers employed with Parties.\*
- Develop and advise COMEAGLE on specific courses of action to ensure compliance with the military aspects of the Peace Agreement by the Parties.
- Assist COMEAGLE in determining and implementing local cooperative measures and resolutions of disputes between the Parties.
- Report to COMARRC the results of TF Eagle JMCs in accordance with Annex I.
- Develop and track measures of success for COMEAGLE's campaign vision."<sup>51</sup>

Assisting in the Joint Commission process were the Joint Commission Observers (JCO).

These JCOs were initially comprised of British special forces remaining in sector from




Figure 9 - MND-N JMC Structure<sup>47</sup>




Figure 10 - MND-N JMC Operations<sup>48</sup>

\* As will be discussed in chapter 4, the JMC never had authority to command or control the JCOs. This perception of authority by the JMC caused initial confusion among both the JCOs and subordinate elements on who was in charge. See also CALL informal lessons learned files on SOF support to TF Eagle. Unpublished.

UNPROFOR period. Their mission was to “observe and liaise with the entity/faction leadership on behalf of the corps and division commanders to promote the peace initiatives of the Joint Commission.”<sup>52</sup>

#### Section IV. Conclusion

NATO introduced a vastly improved military capability into Bosnia as it replaced UNPROFOR. What had been a peace (or conflict) monitoring force became a peace enforcement force. Each of the three multinational division forces had sufficient combat power and command and control to enforce the peace in their sectors if deemed necessary. During both Joint Endeavor and Joint Guard, the joint force commander enforced the peace through his multinational division commanders. Each had full responsibility for actions in his sector. Within this context, the next chapter describes how Special Forces supported the commanders of these MNDs. This will provide a basis to answer the questions posed in the first chapter:

- Did we “wring every ounce of capability from the Special Forces to retain effectiveness with less redundancy,” as Joint Vision 2010 challenges?
- Did we create efficient command and control structures responsive to the MND commanders’ needs?
- Was there clear direction in terms of what we wanted from the Special Forces units?

## Chapter 4. SF Operations in Bosnia

### Section I. General

U.S. Special Forces missions and organization in Bosnia evolved from the inception of NATO SF support during UNPROFOR, through the IFOR period, to current operations supporting SFOR. The CJSOTF, JCO, and LCE operations all changed. As noted in chapter 3, the CJSOTF transitioned from a British led force to one that was U.S. led. The JCO concept likewise changed from a British "directed telescope" force for the ARRC commander<sup>53</sup> to a U.S. Special Forces "strategic assessment" force directly supporting MND commanders. Lastly, the LCE presence decreased significantly after the first few months of Joint Endeavor as MNDs established organic liaison capabilities. After a short description of UNPROFOR activities, subsequent sections lay out SF support chronologically from 1995 through 1997.

### Section II. UNPROFOR

NATO Special Forces, notably the UK Special Air Service (SAS) and Royal Dutch Marines, operated in Bosnia supporting the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) prior to the inception of IFOR.<sup>54</sup> In 1994, UK Lieutenant General Michael Rose, the UNPROFOR commander (and formerly the SAS Regimental Commander during the Falklands War) brought in the SAS as his personal "directed telescopes."<sup>\*</sup> He called his SAS teams Joint Commission Observers (JCOs). Having commanded the SAS, he understood their capabilities and used them to cut through the slow and unreliable UNPROFOR command structure to provide frank situation assessments. He directed these JCOs to do more than just provide assessments; he also

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<sup>\*</sup> Per the earlier referenced CSI study, the directed telescope concept is the use of specially selected, highly qualified, and trusted young officers as special agents or observers for the commander to provide him the most rapid, reliable, and efficient means of providing tactical information, communicating critical orders, and controlling subordinate units. See Pg 1 of CSI Study.

used them as forward air controllers for airstrikes against Gorazde and Srebrenica, and in other operations.<sup>55</sup> This JCO concept remained in operation throughout UNPROFOR, and continued into the IFOR time period.

### Section III. IFOR - Joint Endeavor

In late 1995, as NATO began planning for IFOR, three essential special operations tasks were identified: develop a liaison/advisory assistance capability for the non-NATO forces deploying with IFOR (the LCE concept), continue some form of the JCO concept, and continue to maintain a rapid reaction special operations capability to support the IFOR commander. This monograph focuses on the LCE and JCO tasks.

The LCE concept was presented in November 1995 during an ARRC command post exercise, "Arcade Fusion." The U.S. 10<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group (SFG) Commander, COL Geoffrey Lambert,\* with the concurrence of SOCEUR, recommended to Lt Gen Michael Walker (ARRC commander) that USSF could help meld the disparate non-NATO forces within the command structure of IFOR.<sup>57</sup> COL Lambert

identified five key LCE functions (depicted in figure 11) that could assist the ARRC and MND commanders in rapidly integrating these forces into their command structure.

This LCE concept was not meant to replace

formal LNO exchanges. Rather it was conceived as an early deploying enabling force to bridge the gap temporarily by providing initial C<sup>3</sup>I connectivity prior to the establishment of

Mission: Facilitate NATO C<sup>3</sup>I and access to NATO CAS, and CASEVAC for supported non-NATO unit, in order to enable interoperability with IFOR.

#### LCE functions:

- Call for or coordinate CAS or indirect fire
- Call for or coordinate CASEVAC
- Intell Connectivity
- Secure communications connectivity
- Tactical level liaison

**Figure 11 - LCE Mission and Tasks<sup>56</sup>**

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\* COL Lambert was promoted to Brigadier General as is currently Commander, SOCEUR.

conventional force liaison elements. During this initial time period, the LCEs would also train non-NATO forces in NATO fire support\* and casualty evacuation procedures.

Lt Gen Walker approved the LCE concept, and SOCEUR and the 10<sup>th</sup> SFG staff developed the plan for SF employment in late November 1995. In December 1995, elements from 10<sup>th</sup> SFG, located at Fort Carson, Colorado, other Special Forces units in the U.S. with the required language skills and possessing cultural knowledge of the disparate non-NATO nations, and 10<sup>th</sup> SFG's forward stationed battalion in Germany, the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, deployed to an Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) in

San Vito Air Station, Brindisi, Italy.

At the ISB they drew equipment, and

conducted LCE training and

certification. Selected LCEs

subsequently deployed to Troop

Contributing Nation (TCN) home

locations, and linked up with their

respective unit for follow-on

deployment into Bosnia. Other LCEs, whose TCN counterpart forces were already in Bosnia,

deployed directly to Bosnia, and moved to their counterpart TCN force location. January 1996

LCE locations are depicted on the map in figure 12. Six LCEs were initially in MND-N: with

the Nordic-Polish brigade headquarters and its subordinate Polish battalion, with two Pakistani

battalions, the Turkish brigade, and the Russian brigade.†





Figure 12 - IFOR U.S. Special Forces LCE & SOCCE Locations<sup>58</sup>

\* Each LCE team had one assigned USAF Special Operations Tactical Air Controller (SOTAC).

† The Polish Battalion LCE was rapidly replaced by NORD-POL brigade headquarters liaison personnel and withdrawn in early Feb 96. One of the two Pakistani battalion LCEs withdrew early in the operation as did several other nations forces supporting (and funded by) the UNPROFOR operation. As shown in the accompanying figure depicting LCE locations, the other Pakistani unit moved to MND-SW.

Beginning in March 1996, in accordance with the ARRC D+120 review plan, a methodical review began assessing which LCEs were still required. By this time, MND commanders had established robust C<sup>3</sup>I and liaison with their subordinate TCN forces, and many of the TCN forces were fully integrated into the NATO fire support and casualty evacuation systems. Selected LCE teams were withdrawn after both the TCN and MND commanders were confident that a positive transition of functions was complete and approved the withdrawal. By the end of March nine of the twelve LCEs had departed. Three remained - one with the Russian Brigade in MND-N, the other two with the Hungarian Brigade and Romanian Battalion, all at the request of the TCN commanders.

The second special operations task was the continuation of the Joint Commission Observer concept. This JCO operation continued with IFOR much as it had been developed for UNPROFOR. Many of the same non-U.S. SF personnel remained in Bosnia during the transition to IFOR, and were initially the most credible source of information on the capabilities and intentions of the FWF.<sup>60</sup> Of the six JCO



**Figure 13 - IFOR U.K. Special Forces JCO Locations<sup>59</sup>**

teams, two were in the MND-N sector. These two JCO teams remained under the control of the CJSOTF, but established liaison with MND-N. JCOs in the French and British sector, depending on their national orientation, were included in those MND command structures.

The JCO tasks under IFOR consisted of direct liaison, communications, and information exchange with the FWF forces. Their long term, special relationship with the various factions made them a valuable source of information in helping the MND-N commanders understand

“intent and actions” of the factions, and in explaining their desires and intent to the factions.<sup>61</sup>

Focused on maintaining access to factional leaders, the JCO leaders felt that any close association with intelligence collection agencies could threaten their special access relationship. Subsequently, they declined to attend the weekly MND-N G2 human intelligence planning meetings and didn't know MND intelligence requirements.<sup>63</sup> Partly as a result of this lack of understanding, their operations occasionally conflicted with collection assets working with the same sources.<sup>64</sup> However, the MND-N G3 (LTC Mike Jones) felt the British JCOs were very competent, and responsive during crises, despite the lack of any definitive command relationship with TF Eagle.<sup>65</sup>


The CJSOTF exercised NATO TACON of the U.S. LCEs and OPCON of British JCOs in MND-N through two separate chains of command. It exercised NATO TACON of USSF through their parent battalion headquarters (1/10 SFG\*) located in Sarejevo. Control of the LCEs supporting each MND was exercised through a USSF company headquarters configured as a Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE) located at each division headquarters. The CJSOTF exercised OPCON of the British JCOs through their organic (squadron)

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graph TD
    USAREUR[USAREUR]
    IFOR[IFOR]
    SOCIFOR[SOCIFOR]
    ARRC[ARRC]
    AFNAV[AF & NAVY COMPONENT]
    CJSOTF[CJSOTF]
    MNDSE[MND SE]
    MNDSW[MND SW]
    MNDN[MND N]
    UKSF[UK SF (JCOs)]
    FRSF[FR SF]
    ITSF[IT SF]
    NLCONT[NL CONTINGENT]
    NLSF[NL SF]
    SFG[1/10 SFG]
    SOCCE[US SOCCE in MND-N]
    LCEs[LCEs]
    Other[Other SOCCEs & LCEs]

    USAREUR -- "COMMAND/OPCON" --> SFG
    USAREUR -- "COMMAND" --> CJSOTF
    SFG -- "COMMAND" --> SOCCE
    SOCCE -- "COMMAND" --> LCEs
    SFG -- "COMMAND" --> Other
    CJSOTF -- "COMMAND" --> UKSF
    CJSOTF -.- "NATO TACON" --> FRSF
    CJSOTF -.- "NATO TACON" --> ITSF
    CJSOTF -.- "NATO TACON" --> NLSF
    IFOR -- "COMMAND" --> MNDSE
    IFOR -- "COMMAND" --> MNDSW
    IFOR -- "COMMAND" --> MNDN
    MNDSE -- "COMMAND" --> FRSF
    MNDSW -- "COMMAND" --> NLCONT
    NLCONT -- "COMMAND" --> NLSF
    FRSF -.- "NATO TACON" --> NLCONT
    FRSF -.- "COORDINATION" --> NLCONT
    ITSF -.- "NATO TACON" --> NLCONT
    ITSF -.- "COORDINATION" --> NLCONT
    NLSF -.- "NATO TACON" --> NLCONT
    NLSF -.- "COORDINATION" --> NLCONT
  
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Figure 14 - SF Command Structure in MND-N during the 1990s



**Figure 14 - SF Command Structure in MND-N during IFOR<sup>66</sup>**

\* 1/10 SFG was the first USSF battalion headquarters to rotate into Bosnia in IFOR. Later, all three 10<sup>th</sup> SFG battalions (1<sup>st</sup> bn, 2<sup>nd</sup> bn, and 3<sup>rd</sup> bn) would rotate through Bosnia to exercise USSF command and control. The bn headquarters was called a Forward Operating Base (FOB).

headquarters also located at the MND headquarters. See figure 14.

The command relationship of USSF and British SF to MND-N was different. Whereas the Commander of MND-N exercised NATO TACON of the USSF, the British JCOs remained under the full OPCON of the British led CJSOTF. The next section on SFOR describes the changing command relationship under the U.S. CJSOTF when both the LCEs and JCOs were under the NATO TACON of the MND-N commander.

#### Section IV. SFOR - Joint Guard

In early October 1996, LANDCENT was preparing to assume command of IFOR from AFSOUTH, and the 1<sup>st</sup> ID was preparing to cover the withdrawal of 1<sup>st</sup> AD from Bosnia with a potential follow-on stabilization mission in Bosnia. Concurrently, the commander of SOCEUR, BG Geoffrey Lambert, was determining requirements for USSF support of these envisioned operations through discussions with the LANDCENT headquarters. He also decided that SOCIFOR and CJSOTF would be combined into one headquarters mirroring the LANDCENT headquarters replacement of both ARRC and IFOR.\*

During this planning period, MG Meigs, Commanding General of 1<sup>st</sup> ID, realizing that his force was not as robust as the 1<sup>st</sup> AD, identified the requirement for increased situational awareness in MND-N. His G5, a Special Forces Major who had previously served with Special Forces in Haiti, recommended that Special Forces working with the local populace and with U.S. Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations personnel could help gain situational awareness.<sup>67</sup> A short time later, the 1<sup>st</sup> ID sent IFOR a statement of requirements (SOR) for a large contingent

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\* LANDCENT simplified the command structure of IFOR, with LANDCENT assuming the role previously exercised by both AFSOUTH (as IFOR) and the ARRC. The new SOF structure disestablished the SOCIFOR, with the CJSOTF assuming previous SOCIFOR and CJSOTF functions. See also chapter 3.

of Special Forces to support MND-N.\* At IFOR, this MND-N requirement was discussed with the CJSOTF. It was subsequently included as a CJSOTF, not MND-N, requirement in the IFOR SOR to SACEUR.<sup>68</sup>

With this formal requirement from COMIFOR, COMSOCEUR (BG Lambert), a Supporting Commander, directed the Commander of 10<sup>th</sup> SFG to deploy an assessment team to 1<sup>st</sup> ID to determine their specific requirements,<sup>†</sup> develop a supporting plan to support those requirements, and receive MG Meigs' approval. COMSOCEUR gave specific guidance on his vision for SF support in his "Commander's Guidance - Transition to LANDCENT" memorandum dated 16 October 1996:

**"SOCCEs:** SOCCEs are the critical links to the divisions and must be members of the divisional teams. They must seek true integration with the staffs. They must be honest brokers and provide all information from the JCOs and LCEs to the division commanders...

**JCOs:** I expect these to be the best we can offer. They need mature leadership, excellent judgment, and the ability to make and sustain friends (*referring to maintaining access with the entities*<sup>‡</sup>). They must be honest brokers, trusted by all to have no hidden agendas. They are not spies and are not recruiting anyone. Their **mission is to work for the divisions**, help with liaison with Former Warring Factions, and assist in coordination with civil authorities... ..Their overarching task and measure of success is to be accepted by the entities and succeed in giving the division commander what he needs."<sup>69</sup>

Colonel Les Fuller, Commander of 10<sup>th</sup> SFG, directed LTC Charlie Cleveland<sup>§</sup> to work with MG Meigs and his staff (and the other MND commanders) in developing future plans for SF support. LTC Cleveland's task was to perform a *troop to task* analysis; i.e. determine the

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\* The actual SOR (SOR #8) is unavailable but numerous sources state that the SOR requested an SF battalion headquarters and two companies. Also, while inferred there is no substantiated direct link between LTC Malik's recommendation and the SOR submission. Other reports attribute the thoughts behind a SF inclusion in the SOR to a COL Dave Hunt from AFSOUTH speaking with MG Meigs.

<sup>†</sup> While the team also worked with the other MND cdrs; this monograph focuses on MND-N.

<sup>‡</sup> Explanation in italics by author.

<sup>§</sup> LTC Charlie Cleveland was the 10<sup>th</sup> SFG Deputy Commander, and slated to assume command of 3/10<sup>th</sup> SFG in summer of 1997. He was the deputy commander of the CJSOTF during this November - December 1996 time period when he developed the SF troop to task concept of support.

specific needs of the MND commanders, and develop a concept of support and required size of the force. During LTC Cleveland's meeting with MG Meigs, his JMC, and staff in November 1996, MG Meigs told him an information void existed; "Gaps and Seams have widened."<sup>70</sup> MG Meigs requested that LTC Cleveland develop a plan that would satisfy the 1<sup>st</sup> ID's continuing requirements to maintain access with key military and civilian personnel, but also assist in gaining better situational awareness on the sentiments and attitudes of the local populace and other 1<sup>st</sup> ID PIR.\*

The developed concept for SF support was quite different from that which had served the ARRC. First, per COMSOCEUR's guidance, the JCOs would work for the MND commanders - not the SFOR commander. While they had the communications capability to serve as "directed telescopes" for COMSFOR, their mission was to support the MND commanders' requirements. Second, certain teams would be focused on gaining and maintaining access to key FWF personnel; others had the task of gaining situational awareness in their area. The MND commander could decide which was more important for each team, maintaining access to FWF leaders or gaining this situational awareness.<sup>†</sup> LTC Cleveland's restated mission for SF, approved by MG Meigs, was far different than the "Provide access to FWF" of earlier JCO mission statements. It stated:

"On order, SF conducts Information Operations in MND North to assist in monitoring the GFAP, promoting stability and reducing hostilities by providing timely information on the sentiment and attitudes of the general population and commander's PIR."<sup>71</sup>

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\* PIR= Priority Intelligence Requirements

<sup>†</sup> LTC Cleveland recommended two distinct types of units to support the MND: the first, JCOs would continue traditional JCO tasks of maintaining access. The second, dubbed Strategic Assessment Teams (SATs) would focus on providing the additional situational awareness like that requested by MG Meigs. COL Rabon, the MND-N JMC Chief recommended (and LTC Cleveland agreed) that all teams be called JCOs to minimize confusion.

This mission statement is, however, far different than that ultimately directed by the CJSOTF (See figure 15). This difference is further discussed in the following assessment chapter.

Regardless, the new concept of SF support resulted in a large increase of USSF in Bosnia with ten JCO teams deployed in the MND-N sector directly responsive to the 1<sup>st</sup> ID commander by January 1997 as depicted in figure 16.

Key to the concept of JCOs working directly for the MND commanders as BG Lambert had directed was delineating the corresponding


command relationship. The CJSOTF directed that the SOCCE would be under NATO TACON of the MND, and had OPCON of all JCOs and LCEs in sector. As addressed in chapter 2, this command relationship provided the gaining commander (CG, MND-N) authority to direct priorities, receive direct communications, and direct local maneuver required to accomplish previously *assigned* missions or tasks. It did not authorize the gaining commander to assign new missions or tasks. The seeming discontinuity of this limited command relationship with the above concept of *working for the MND commander* is also discussed in the next chapter.

**Mission:** On order, Joint Commission Observers assist Entity Armed Forces Leaders liaison with designated Multi-National Divisional Commands in support of SFOR objectives. Be prepared to respond to crisis by acting as a communications conduit between responsible elements in order to defuse or minimize the crisis.

**Tasks:**

- Establish routine contacts with key civilian/military individuals in EAF, as well as displaced persons and general population.
- Act as impartial honest brokers.
- Provide ground truth to MND CDR through passive collection.
- Respond to crisis—defuse problems before they escalate.
- Coordinate with NGOs and civilian authorities.
- Compress communications hierarchy.

**Figure 15 - CJSOTF Directed JCO Mission and Tasks**<sup>72</sup>



**Figure 16- SF Support in January 1997**<sup>73</sup>

The second enabler for the concept was a strong SOCCE that would ensure that MND commanders' priorities in terms of access or situational awareness were articulated to the outlying JCO teams. The small four man 'caretaker' SOCCE in MND-N, maintained during the

latter half of Joint Endeavor, was

replaced by a robust SOCCE

comprised of an augmented SF

company headquarters commanded

by a major. The SF battalion

commander providing forces to

MND-N personally briefed the

division commander, key leaders, and staff (notably the CofS, G2, G3, and JMC chief) on

approved mission profiles for USSF, and ensured they knew the senior SF individual in their

sector, the SOCCE commander.

Mission: Conduct C3I of all USSOF operations in the supported MND AOR, in order to ensure synchronization of SOF effort with the MND. On order, provide C3I, support, and coordination (as required) for Combined/Joint SOF operations in the MND AO.

**Mission Essential Tasks:**

- Provide C3I for US SOF in sector.
- Advise the MND CDR on use of SF.
- Integrate SOF into the MND plan.
- Deconflict SOF operations.
- Provide responsive information conduit to MND CDR / G-3.

**Figure 17 - SOCCE Mission and Tasks<sup>74</sup>**

From January through November 1997, USSF tasks continued to evolve as the MND-N commander reacted to the changing environment in Bosnia and SFOR requirements. As the SFOR and MND-N commander identified new threats or gaps in information, they reprioritized USSF support. For example, MG Grange, who relieved MG Meigs in August 1997, through interaction with the CJSOTF and the SOCCE, focused USSF JCOs on access to Special Police leaders in addition to the EAF as he identified contact and information on those elements as essential to success.<sup>75</sup>

In late 1997, and continuing into 1998, COMSFOR increased tasking USSF JCOs through his CJSOTF to answer specific ground truth and provide real-time information. This "focused telescope" concept was similar to that exercised during IFOR by the ARRC in their employment of the British JCO teams. However, no change in command relationships was

directed.<sup>76</sup> Rather, the SFOR and CJSOTF coordinated the taskings with the subordinate MNDs.

The Commander of CJSOTF, COL Bruce Hoover, notes:

“COMSFOR (GEN Shinseki) arrived in July just before I took over (Aug 97). The longer he was there and the more he became comfortable with his SOF, the more value he placed on them. During my 6 months (Aug 97 - Feb 98), there was a marked increase in his direction and tasking for the JCOs, as opposed to mere employment by the MND Cdrs only. His J-3, MG Burns (US) is very knowledgeable of the JCO capability and how they can contribute to theater strategy. More and more, GEN Shinseki and his staff routinely require ground truth and real-time information that only the JCO teams can provide.”<sup>77</sup>

Thus, whereas SF support was directed (and actually decentralized) to MND level in the early period of SFOR, COMSFOR subsequently increased direct tasking of the JCOs through the CJSOTF while still providing MND commanders TACON of JCOs in their sector. Who did the JCOs work for? Were they directed telescopes for COMSFOR or did they provide situational awareness and access for the MND commanders? Did their command relationships correspond with their taskings? One may question whether COMSFOR could not have provided the MND commanders full authority to task JCOs, and then request this information from the MND commanders, or clearly subordinate the JCOs under the COMSFOR's direct control as *directed telescopes*. Either action may have better clarified their mission and the MND commanders' authority.

#### Section V. Conclusion


In anticipation of Operation Joint Guard, COMSOCEUR in coordination with the supported commander, determined that USSF JCO teams would work for the division commanders and give the division commanders what they needed. This clear guidance combined with MND-N requirements for continued access with the EAF and increased situational awareness resulted in a marked increase of JCO teams in the MND-N sector within a

month of mission notification. The next chapter assesses the actual “jointness” of this effort by using numerous personal observations to answer the associated criteria and measures of merit.

## Chapter 5. Assessment

### Section I. General

This chapter assesses the coherency of USSF and U.S. Division joint operations in MND-N. As developed in chapter two, and depicted in the adjacent figure, the two criteria used in assessing this jointness are the effectiveness of the USSF in performing their missions and the efficiency of joint employment of USSF in MND-N.



**Figure 18 - Criteria**

### Section II. Effective Component Forces

This section assesses only the effectiveness of USSF in terms of its competence in performing missions in Bosnia. It does not address either the level of competence of the U.S. conventional forces in performing the myriad their newly determined peace operations mission essential tasks nor the quality of their relationship and reputation with their multinational partners.

There were a number of reasons to expect a high degree of competence from USSF soldiers and teams in Bosnia. The tasks they performed were closely related to their unit's normal mission essential task list (METL) of special reconnaissance and foreign internal defense.\* Both of these tasks require regional awareness and the ability to interface with indigenous personnel. Foreign internal defense requires proficiency in advisory assistance – the

\* Special Reconnaissance and Foreign Internal Defense are two of the five doctrinal Special Forces missions. Detailed descriptions of these two missions may be found in Joint Publication 3-05, Doctrine For Special Operations and FM 31-20, Special Forces Operations.

principal task the LCEs continue to perform in Bosnia. Additionally, Special Forces soldiers all completed the demanding Special Forces Qualification Course and annual skill certifications required by USSOCOM and developed by the U.S. Army Special Forces Command. They had also gone through a pre-deployment certification program required by USAREUR.

Two major components of the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC) ensure basic competence. The first is the assessment phase that ensures incoming soldiers are mature, experienced soldiers. Special Forces is a non-assession branch; i.e. all of its soldiers have a minimum of 2-4 years of previous experience in the army before becoming eligible for institutional training and subsequent acceptance into SF. Thus, Special Forces branch can review each soldier's prior service record to ensure he has the "right stuff" before being allowed to begin SFQC. The second component is the institutional training portion which provides tactical and technical training, and intercultural communications skills consisting of language, nonverbal communications, cultural orientation, and interpersonal skills.<sup>78</sup> SF soldiers learn these skills in both the SFQC institutional training, and follow-on unit enhancement and sustainment programs.<sup>79</sup>

Intercultural communications skills are part of every Special Forces unit's METL and are included in the unit's enhancement and sustainment training program. They are SF's de facto "bread and butter." In most operations SF operate in an advisory role, with no command authority over troops of its coalition partner. Under these conditions, SF relies heavily on intercultural skills, using persuasion and good personal relationships to accomplish their mission. This is different than most conventional units which normally operate within more clear command relationships to ensure compliance. Many of the officers and NCOs in SF units further enhance their intercultural communications skills through additional schooling and during numerous deployments working directly with foreign forces. This experience results in an

average SF soldier who is 31 years old, possesses two years of college education, and has more than ten years of active military service.<sup>80</sup> This maturity and experience "allow these soldiers to work well with foreign military, political and civil leaders."<sup>81</sup>

As noted by the G3 of 1<sup>st</sup> AD during IFOR, the LCEs were very effective in these "bread and butter" tasks:

"There was some degree of redundancy with the LCEs and LNOs, but having both were beneficial. First, the LCEs had the communications gear our LNOs lacked. Secondly, they had the communications and tactical expertise to teach and if need be deliver close air support, artillery support, etc. to get the combat multipliers to the Russians if they had needed that. We weren't quite ready to have the Russians pick that up as soon as the LNOs hit the ground. Eventually, after the LNOs were on the ground, we began trimming the LCE, but they remained necessary and helpful for long into the summer."<sup>82</sup>

BG Cherrie, the Assistant Division Commander of 1<sup>st</sup> AD during IFOR, reinforces this judgment of the competence of the USSF LCEs stating,

"We need to have USSF in these kind of operations. They were worth their weight in gold. One of the invaluable things about SF is that they live with the people, they can give you the feel which way the wind is blowing. When you got your SF in there, you got a feel for what's going on."<sup>83</sup>

The USSF during SFOR were also effective after the first few months of learning the environment and transitioning from a British type of directed telescope to more of a strategic assessment capability. MG Meigs' G2, LTC Jeff Rapp, notes:

"...they (JCO) were good folks, professional and provided good support... The JCOs greatest value was in establishing an ability for our CG to communicate with the FWF leaders immediately during crisis-type situations... they also gave us insights into the attitudes, mindset, etc. of these leaders so we could further mutual understanding..."<sup>84</sup>

MG David Grange, CG of 1<sup>st</sup> ID, states,

"Their operational procedures, training, and cultural awareness make them invaluable for employment in the current environment."

Summarizing, USSF was a competent force executing METL related tasks in Bosnia. These tasks took advantage of special forces' intercultural communications skills, and their tactical and technical proficiency in advisory assistance. They were competent at both the

individual soldier level and at the LCE and JCO unit level. Thus, USSF provided an effective component building block for employment by the joint force commander. The chart below summarizes assessment of the *competent forces* measure of merit.

Measure of Merit	Joint Endeavor	Early Joint Guard (Jan - Mar 97)	Later Joint Guard
<b>Competence</b>	+	0	+

The next section examines how well these building blocks fit together to form a coherent joint force.

### Section III. Efficient Joint Employment

The second criterion, efficient joint employment, addresses the optimization of U.S. Special Forces capabilities in the accomplishment of the MND-N mission. This optimization was dependent both on decisions by the joint force commander concerning *fit of forces*, *command relationships*, and where applicable by the designated command relationship - *mission direction*, and actual integration of special forces operations in MND-N. The fourth measure of merit, *mutual trust*, was a significant factor affecting both JFC decisions and operations within MND-N.

The following analysis addresses each measure of merit separately, and then addresses of the measures, and concludes with a summary of their ultimate effect on coherent operations.

#### Subsection IIIa. Tailored Fit

Were USSF JCO and LCE operations during Joint Endeavor and Joint Guard an optimal fit of special forces in support of a peace operation? Initially no, but fit of forces improved during Joint Guard as SF's intercultural skills were exploited to provide access to the EAF and provide situational awareness.

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\* Legend for this and succeeding charts is: + Good <==> 0 Average <==> - Marginal

While beyond the scope of this paper, USSF missed a great opportunity to support peace operations optimally during the early period of Joint Endeavor. National level decisions restricting U.S. ground operations in Bosnia prior to execution of Joint Endeavor kept USSF from being in place from the start providing intelligence on the ground situation, which was what the U.S. conventional commanders most desperately needed - and didn't get from in place NATO forces.<sup>85</sup>

Suboptimal USSF support continued during Joint Endeavor with COMSOCEUR opting to not recommend use of USSF to assist in providing situational awareness reporting to U.S. conventional ground forces. Instead, these U.S. forces were forced to rely on reports from British and other non-U.S. special forces to gain situational awareness and access to the FWF. While fully justified from a combined special operations headquarters force allocation perspective, this lack of USSF support to U.S. forces in MND-N was in stark contrast with the British and French conventional divisions in the other sectors who had national special forces supporting their requirements. It caused considerable criticism by these U.S. conventional force commanders.<sup>86</sup> USSF support of U.S. Commanders in this first year -the critical year- was limited unfortunately to that of providing liaison teams (the LCEs), a function rapidly taken over by the MNDs' organic liaison teams.

With COMSOCEUR's guidance in  
October 1996 directing USSF to work for

"JCOs can be the best overt tool for gathering information on the battlefield in a multinational environment."

-BG Lambert, COMSOCEUR<sup>87</sup>

the divisions, the *fit of forces* during Joint Guard improved significantly, with USSF deploying to support MND-N situational assessment requirements. This *fit of forces* effectively exploited SF's intercultural skills to support MND-N requirements for continued access and situational awareness. Key to this decision was the implied reduction of a "directed telescope" role by the JCOs for the JFC. The JCOs no longer worked directly for the JFC. They now satisfied MND

commander requirements with the assumption that by satisfying MND requirements they also satisfied COMSFOR requirements indirectly. The chart below summarizes assessment of the fit of forces measure of merit.

Measure of Merit	Joint Endeavor	Early Joint Guard (Jan - Mar 97)	Later Joint Guard
Competence	+	o	+
<b>Fit of Forces</b>	-	+	+
C2			
Direction			
Mutual Trust			

### Subsection IIIb Command Relationships

Did the stated NATO TACON command relationship of USSF with MND-N provide sufficient control to the commander responsible for conducting “coherent joint operations” in the MND-N sector? To answer this question, the following supporting questions are addressed:

- Who was the commander responsible for conducting “coherent joint operations” in the MND-N sector?
- Was the NATO TACON relationship conducive toward creating the “agile” MND-N organization as envisioned by Joint Vision 2010 to allow the conduct of coherent joint operations?
- Was the exercised command authority consistent with that specified in a “NATO TACON” relationship? In other words, did actual operations and coordination adhere to the NATO TACON command relationship?
- What was the COMSFOR role in determining the relationship of SOF with MND commanders – specifically on whether to centralize control of SF under the CJSOTF or decentralize its control under the major subordinate commanders, the MND commanders?

•Based on the definition of NATO TACON and comments already made in this chapter, the short answer to the principal question is No. NATO TACON did not provide sufficient control to the MND-N commander. It did not provide him the authority to task SF JCOs when confronted by changing situations.

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\* Most discussion of command relationships is limited to the time period Jan - Nov 97. This period, rather than during Joint Endeavor, was the period of most USSF operations in MND-N.

•First, who was responsible for conducting “coherent joint operations” in the MND-N sector? The MND-N commander was responsible. The MND-N mission directed: “TF Eagle enforces compliance with GFAP, maintains presence throughout sector, ensures force protection, and deters resumption of hostilities in order to promote stability in BH.”<sup>88</sup> MND-N was assigned a sector by COMSFOR. Joint Publication 1-02 defines sector as “an area designated by boundaries within which a unit operates, and for which it is responsible.”<sup>89</sup> Thus, SF JCOs were operating in the MND-N sector for which the MND commander was responsible. No separate areas of operation within the MND-N sector were delineated by the JFC for SF operations. Therefore, whatever the USSF mission, the MND-N commander was responsible for the conduct of all “joint operations” in his sector.

•Second, was the TACON relationship conducive toward creating an “agile” MND-N organization as envisioned by Joint Vision 2010? Webster’s dictionary defines agility “as the state of being readily able to move quickly and easily.” FM 101-5-1 similarly defines it as “The ability of friendly forces to act faster than the enemy.” Both of these definitions speak to an ability to act quickly. The Army Capstone manual, FM 100-5, includes agility as one of the five tenets of army operations. It states that “at all levels of war, successful application of maneuver requires agility of *thought, plans, operations, and organizations*.”<sup>90</sup>

FM 100-5 also emphasizes the importance of agility in peacekeeping operations:

“In peacekeeping operations, Army forces might defuse conditions that would otherwise lead to a resumption of fighting by recognizing the inherent dangers and by resolving grievances before they ignite into open combat. A situational awareness that perceives and anticipates changes in the environment, combined with the ability to act quickly within the intent of higher commanders, leads to an agility in operations other than war that is vital to successful outcomes.”<sup>91</sup>

Can a commander act quickly within the intent of higher commanders when he does not possess the authority to direct subordinates to perform tasks? The MND commanders and staff believe the answer is no. NATO TACON did not give them the required authority to respond

quickly to changing situations on the ground. BG Cherrie, discussing the limited TACON authority, notes,

“This concept of having some SOF guy sitting in a ground commander’s sector taking his orders from some astronomical SOF headquarters level doesn’t make sense. This SOF guy down here is responsible to the ground commander. Things happen quickly down here; we can’t wait for somebody else to make a decision about something that he knows nothing about.

The SOF headquarters up top, trains him, prepares him, cares for him, but then parcels these guys out, and then they should be working for the ground tactical commander. Everything is tied to sector, and what goes on in that sector ought to be sector commander’s responsibility. And it is, except for SOF operations. We’ve got to get away from that. Why we can’t work SF like we do with the other forces we get is beyond me.”<sup>92</sup>

BG Cherrie also introduces the concept of simplicity as a necessary condition for agility.

Clausewitz states: “The conduct of war resembles the working of an intricate machine with tremendous friction, so that combinations which are easily planned on paper can be executed only with great effort.”<sup>93</sup> Simple things work; complex things don’t. Joint Pub 1 incorporates simplicity as the first C2 consideration in joint operations:

“The primary emphasis in command relations should be to keep the chain of command short and simple so that it is clear who is in charge of what. The importance of an efficient joint force command structure cannot be overstated.”<sup>94</sup>

Clear lines of command for the JCOs were not possible when two disparate headquarters, both geographically separated with different missions, shared control (OPCON and TACON) of them for an indefinite time period, under changing conditions, and requiring continuing modifications of orders.

The final rationale on why TACON does not provide agility is in its genesis. U.S. TACON was developed to provide a commander with limited authority to exercise tactical level control over other commander’s assets for a short or specified duration, limited to a specified area.<sup>95</sup> It facilitated short duration actions such as when one unit was passing through another unit’s area of operation and the higher commander wanted to maintain unity of command during

the passage time period.\* TACON was not devised to include the authority to assign tasks in response to an evolving situation. Thus, TACON was not meant as a command relationship that allows long term agility; rather, it is a command relationship that permits unity of command for a short period of time in the conduct of previously prescribed tasks.

•Third, was the command authority actually exercised consistent with that specified in a “NATO TACON” relationship?” No. Interestingly enough, when everyone adhered to the formal definition of NATO TACON, overall JCO effectiveness was poor. Only when the formal TACON definition was reinterpreted to permit the MND-N commander to “task” JCOs within mission parameters did JCO effectiveness improve.

Initially, from January - March 1997, the authority defined in NATO TACON was strictly enforced by the CJSOTF, SF Battalion Headquarters, and SOCCE. This was also the same time period when mutual trust was weak, and when the MND-N Commander noted that the value of what he was receiving from the JCOs “was pretty thin gruel.”<sup>96</sup> In late March, the incoming SF battalion commander, LTC Mike Detrick, reinterpreted the essence of the USSF command relationship to MND-N as NATO TACOM.<sup>97</sup> This command relationship authorized the assignment of tasks by the gaining command (MND-N) within overall mission parameters. This time period was also the turning point in SF-MND relationships, resulting in MG Meigs’ increased satisfaction with SF support.

Regardless of the specific wording of the command relationship, others also came to understand it to permit the assignment of tasks by the MND commanders. Even Colonel Hoover, the Commander of the CJSOTF recalls that in mid 1997, “I personally informed the British MND CG and DCG that TACON did not limit their ability to task the JCOs.”<sup>98</sup>

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\* See discussion of TACON in chapter 2.

•Fourth, What was the COMSFOR role in determining the relationship of SOF with MND commanders – specifically whether to centralize control of SF under the CJSOTF or decentralize its control under the major subordinate commanders, the MND commanders? COMSFOR had no special operations expertise on his staff to provide him unbiased staff recommendations on how to best use special forces to accomplish the SFOR mission. Instead he relied on recommendations by senior SOF officers from CONUS and Theater based SOF headquarters and his subordinate command (the CJSOTF). The CJSOTF recommended a centralized control (OPCON) under the CJSOTF while giving *guidance* that the JCOs and LCEs would work for division commanders. This provided great agility and flexibility for the CJSOTF, and possibly COMSFOR, but did not support the SFOR concept of operations by which MND commanders were responsible for operations in their sector. Lack of COMSFOR special operations staff support and the resulting CJSOTF “bias” in staff recommendations and activities were clearly evident in recent correspondence by a previous COMCJSOTF, Colonel Hoover. He recalls:

“I never got in to brief GEN Shinseki until the end of my 2nd month in the job. Since he had only taken command just before I did, he had never had the formal “this is your CJSOTF” brief. He had lots of questions and his lack of knowledge of ongoing SOF operations was a real eye-opener. Within 3 days, I brought the JCO Team Leader of N-50 (Doboj) to COMSFOR's office to provide he and the MND-N CG with an area overview brief in preparation for a future operation against the Special Police in Doboj. As a result of this and the CJSOTF Command Brief, GEN Shinseki placed whole new stock in ways the JCOs could support his theater strategy. We then began producing a weekly JCO highlights report consolidating key information that JCO teams had reported all week in their individual SITREPs. This was well-received by the COM, J-3, J-2, and the CofS.

...These command relationships must not be presented as restrictive in nature to the conventional (MND) Cdrs. Instead it must be emphasized that the need for SOF OPCON to CJSOTF is to ensure that JCOs and other SOF assets are also available to support theater (GEN Shinseki) strategy.”<sup>99</sup>

Command relationships had not changed; everyone still recognized the MND commanders as the JCO's primary customers. But the above concept circumscribed the established responsibilities of MND commanders for full situational awareness and reporting of

what was occurring in their sectors. Why could COMSFOR not simply task the MND commanders to provide the information COL Hoover describes above? After all, the information came from their sectors. Was the NATO command structure so cumbersome that the commander needed "directed telescopes" to provide him the information he required? Could he not rely on his MND commanders? Or could he have set up a system like a DS mission for Field Artillery where JCOs could have answered requests (like FA calls for fire) in priority from first, the supported, then the force headquarters?

The second (and related) reason for the centralized command relationships was due to the SOF leadership reluctance to decentralize control of special forces. SOF leadership argued for a weak command relationship by MND commanders to maintain agility and flexibility of SF assets and because of their apprehension that conventional commanders might misuse special forces if given OPCON authority. Numerous senior SF officers believed that the concept of decentralizing SF support down to the MND commanders removed a key asset from directly supporting COMSFOR at the strategic or operational level, and marginalized the support to that of only tactical importance. This viewpoint may certainly be valid; however, was GEN Shinseki ever presented an unbiased staff estimate and recommendation to determine his desired concept of support? As far as I can determine, he never was.

MND commanders and staff, in marked contrast, continued to believe that since the COMSFOR held them responsible for "sector" operations, they needed to control everything in their sector. They felt that what was important was not the level of support (e.g. tactical, operational, etc.) but its value in supporting the concept of operations which was focused on MND operations to maintain the peace. Both the MND and CJSOTF could have benefited from clearer direction by the JFC on his concept for SF support.

The resulting weak command relationships split authority and responsibility for JCO operations between the MND commanders (having TACON) and the CJSOTF (maintaining OPCON). Unfortunately, this degraded both unity of command and unity of effort. U.S. conventional commanders could justifiably be wary of overreliance on SF when their continued support could not be guaranteed. This interdependence of command relationships and trust is investigated further in a later subsection.

Summarizing, weak and misunderstood command relationships limited efficient joint direction of USSF in MND-N. Despite continued assurances by most SF officers that TACON was sufficient, gaining commanders felt that it detracted from their ability to accomplish their mission efficiently.

In the end, however, it was the special forces and conventional force commanders and staffs on the ground who proved the inadequacy of the formal TACON relationship by *redefining* its meaning to that closer to OPCON. Both realized the need for increased control (and agility) over USSF by the MND commander in this situation, and implemented informal relationships that allowed him far greater authority than that provided by a TACON relationship.

Measure of Merit	Joint Endeavor	Early Joint Guard (Jan - Mar 97)	Later Joint Guard
Competence	+	o	+
Fit of Forces	-	+	+
C2	0	-	0
Direction			
Mutual Trust			

#### Subsection IIIc Mission Direction

Was mission direction to the JCOs focused and relevant to the needs of the MND-N commander without subjecting the JCOs to undue risk? Two areas must be examined to answer this. The first, and most significant, area is quality of mission direction by the OPCON

headquarters - the CJSOTF. The second area is the quality of direction by MND-N commanders and staff to SF units in MND-N.

• Was mission direction by the OPCON headquarters, the CJSOTF, focused and relevant to the needs of the commander of MND-N? An OPCON headquarters is the responsible command for assigning missions and tasks. With the guidance that JCOs were deployed to support the MND commanders' requirements and *work* for the MND-N commander but only under a TACON relationship, did the CJSOTF assign them relevant, focused missions?

Chapter 4 surfaced significant differences between LTC Cleveland's restated mission statement, approved by MG Meigs, and the JCO mission statement later provided by the CJSOTF (See figure 19). While both mission statements provide numerous

**Initial Restated Mission in Nov 96: (Approved by MG Meigs)**

"On order, SF conducts Information Operations in MND North to assist in monitoring the GFAP, promoting stability and reducing hostilities by *providing timely information on the sentiment and attitudes of the general population and commander's PIR.*"

**CJSOTF JCO Direction in 1997.**

Mission: On order, Joint Commission Observers assist Entity Armed Forces Leaders liaison with designated Multi-National Divisional Commands in support of SFOR objectives. Be prepared to respond to crisis by acting as a communications conduit between responsible elements in order to defuse or minimize the crisis.

**Tasks:**

- Establish routine contacts with key civilian/military individuals in EAF, as well as displaced persons and general population.
- Act as impartial honest brokers.
- Provide ground truth to MND CDR through passive collection.
- Respond to crisis--defuse problems before they escalate.
- Coordinate with NGOs and civilian authorities.
- Compress communications hierarchy.

**Figure 19 - JCO Mission Disconnects**

tasks and a very broad purpose, neither satisfied the FM 101-5 requirement to include essential tasks in the mission statement.\* LTC Cleveland commented, that during the SF Concept brief to MG Meigs in December 1996, MG Meigs wrote "Special Reconnaissance" on the restated

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\* The CJSOTF mission additionally includes a "Be Prepared" mission which doctrinally is not supposed to be in a mission statement. The separation of tasks from the mission statement is also confusing, but is excused as it may have been done to support briefing clarity.

mission to clarify the task he expected from SF.<sup>100</sup> Thus, MG Meigs was focused on the essential task of receiving information necessary to maintain situational awareness from the JCOs (highlighted in italics). This essential task is absent from the subsequent CJSOTF mission statement (it is included in subordinate tasks) that officially gave mission direction to the JCOs during Joint Guard.\*

These rather irrelevant mission orders by the OPCON headquarters negated unity of effort, much less unity of command. As shown, the CJSOTF JCO mission statement did not direct JCOs to accomplish tasks requested by the MND commander. Therefore mission support by the JCOs was impossible without the reinterpretation of TACON to include the authority to assign tasks by the gaining command.

Was actual CJSOTF direction as poor as I describe? Definitely not. The CJSOTF commanders and key staff spent considerable time in each MND headquarters discerning their requirements and providing verbal mission direction to their subordinates. However, written direction was poor.

•The second area is the quality of mission direction by MND-N commanders and staff. While the existence of mission direction by a TACON headquarters may be seen as irregular,<sup>†</sup> the reinterpretation of TACON described above, general officer personalities, and the desire to make things work make it very relevant.

Overall, quality of direction by conventional commanders improved significantly from 1995 to 1997. As will be seen later in the subsections on trust and interdependence, initial direction by conventional force commanders was marginal due to a lack of knowledge on SF capabilities and their externally imposed mission limitations. However, poor mission direction

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\* I never found a written CJSOTF operations order for Joint Guard. Nor did 3 SF Bn cdrs/S3s, two SOCCE commanders, or 2 CJSOTF commanders know of one. Therefore, I am limited to using powerpoint slides as the references for these mission statements.

† TACON does not provide authority to assign tasks or missions.

was not critical for the relatively simple LCE mission during Joint Endeavor. It became much more important in Joint Guard with the expansion of the JCO program. Much of the later improvement of mission direction in 1997 described in later subsections was due to increased understanding of each others' capabilities and an increase in open communications between the conventional forces and SF.

This degree of competence of the MND commanders and staffs in mission guidance to SF had a direct effect on command relationships and trust between SF and conventional forces. A perceived lack of conventional commander's competence in employing SF resulted in restrictive command relationships over USSF. Increased competence strengthened trust and led to more authority being provided the conventional commander to direct SF.

Summarizing, significance of mission direction was negligible for the limited LCE operations in Joint Endeavor. During the early phase of Joint Guard, the CJSOTF provided conflicting mission direction that didn't support MND requirements. Later in Joint Guard, mission direction improved as the CJSOTF and MND staffs worked together closely to identify requirements and provide relevant direction.

Measure of Merit	Joint Endeavor	Early Joint Guard (Jan - Mar 97)	Later Joint Guard
Competence	+	0	+
Fit of Forces	-	+	+
C2	0	-	0
<b>Direction</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>+</b>
Mutual Trust			

### Subsection III.d. Mutual Trust<sup>\*</sup>

•Did the JFC (or his SOF advisor - the CJSOTF) have trust (defined as total confidence in the integrity, ability, and good character<sup>†</sup>) of SF and conventional forces to create an *efficient* fit of forces with clear command relationships and quality mission direction?

•Did mutual trust exist at MND-N level to facilitate open communications, exchange of ideas, and optimal solutions to mission requirements?

As stated, this monograph is limited to SF and MND-N jointness. It is focused on operations and decisions in MND-N. Nonetheless, the first question is pertinent and an answer is at least suggested by the actions and decisions of the JFC. In my judgment, I conclude that either he or his SOF advisor - the CJSOTF commander and other out-of-theater SOF leaders providing advice - did not trust that the MND commanders would properly employ USSF. Therefore, they created an *inefficient* fit of forces with unclear command relationships to keep MND commanders from possibly misusing USSF. But the more pertinent question to this paper is the second; did mutual trust at MND level exist?

Did mutual trust exist at MND-N level to facilitate open communications, exchange of ideas, and optimal solutions to mission requirements? There were two time periods of significantly different levels of trust. The first was a period of relative failure in mutual trust during Joint Endeavor and the early part of Joint Guard. The second was the period of improved trust during the remainder of Operation Joint Guard. This subsection assesses trust during these two periods and discusses what actions improved mutual trust in Joint Guard. This assessment is

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<sup>\*</sup> While this section identifies the period December 1995 to March 1997 as a period of poor joint employment, there are certainly many exceptions. At the lowest level, there were numerous success stories - one is noted in the next subsection. But overall, I label this time period as a general failure in employment due to the reasons stated. And even with this label of failure in employment, the period experienced numerous successes and overall can be summarized as an effective operation - due to the professionalism of the men and women who made it work despite these shortcomings.

<sup>†</sup> Definition of trust in Joint Publication 1.

followed by the last subsection discussing interdependence of trust and the other measures of merit: fit of forces, command relationships, and mission direction.

#### Period of Failure in Mutual Trust (Dec 95 - Mar 97)

Mutual trust was not consistently strong between USSF and the division commanders and staffs between December 1995 and March 1997. Both conventional and SF personnel had different perspectives on whether they each could trust the other.

#### The Conventional Force Perspective

Many U.S. conventional commanders and staff lacked trust in USSF because they felt the special forces were not focused on ensuring MND-N success. They believed USSF were not part of the "team" because of the weak command relationships with MND-N addressed earlier, their not being "productive" members of the TF Eagle team, and the belief that they were avoiding hardships facing conventional troops. This lack of trust reduced open communications and resulted in both elements not receiving the benefits of each other's thoughts when making decisions.

Recalling conditions in December 1995, the G3 of 1<sup>st</sup> AD, LTC Mike Jones, describes relations with the SOCCE, noting the decision by the SOCCE commander to separate the SOCCE physically from the division headquarters, its negative impact on developing strong personal relationships or trust, and how it limited optimal employment:

"Although there was a place for them in the Command Post (CP) at a table, it was very seldom manned, and we did not have much interaction with them. Having the SOCCE separate from the main CP did not help ensure SF was coordinated with the conventional operations (if you can call what we were doing conventional)... It also meant we did not do a very good job of ensuring the SOCCE was aware of all operations going on in the AOR, or understood the issues we were dealing with. Finally, it did not help develop the strong personal relationships we had with other elements that allowed us to quickly sort through problems that did arise."<sup>101</sup>

LTC Jeff Rapp, G2 1<sup>st</sup> ID, notes from early 1997:

"We went through a couple of SOCCE commanders (SF majors). The ones that were most effective were the ones who were always available in the CP to assist in

planning and division response in crisis situations. If the guy wasn't there when the G3 needed him, it reflected badly..."<sup>102</sup>

In both of the above recollections, in addition to seeing a lack of trust in SF, we also see a clear gap in communications which further weakened trust and integration. SF didn't always appear to be leaning forward in establishing communication and trust with the conventional forces. Two SOCCE commanders, SF Captain Jon White (Jan - Mar 97) and Major Steve Damon (Apr - Aug 97) recall discussing one incident that occurred in January:

"We had a case where a team went on a U.S. battalion commander's base in their JCO uniform. Of course, everyone on base was wearing kevlar and body armor, and these JCO guys stuck out like a sore thumb. The battalion commander or S3 (can't recall which) came up and asked 'Who are you guys?' A JCO answered 'I can't tell you, but my call sign is November three five.' The battalion commander responded 'Well, fine then N35, get off my base.' Now, this was a JCO team in that battalion commander's sector - they (the JCOs) were there to support the first echelon of command - the battalion commander. So you have to question what that team's relationship was with their 'customer.'"<sup>103</sup>

Obviously, not a very good initial meeting engagement. But Captain White then tells the rest of the story that helps explain some of the problems that occur when assuming a mission from a force of a different nationality:

"This USSF team had just replaced a UKSF Team who had passed on their technique of only using call signs when working with conventional forces. While this technique may have been okay for a UK operator, it was completely an untenable position for a US soldier in a US Infantry Battalion CP. This, of course, did not initially endear the JCO to the hearts of TF 1-16. Over time, however, the JCOs in Brcko learned and cooperated much more closely with TF 1-16, working as a combat multiplier for LTC Layfield\*."<sup>104</sup>

Nor was USSF providing much of value to MND-N in early 1997 - possibly due both to weak command relationships and a lack of openness to share requirements and capabilities. After several briefings by JCOs to the 1<sup>st</sup> ID division commander in early April 1997, the newly arrived SOCCE commander recalls MG Meigs' reaction:

"MG Meigs stated, 'I'm expending a lot of my resources on supporting your concept of operations, which is supposed to be in support of my MND. But I don't see a lot of

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\* The TF 1-16 commander.

'return' on my investment.' I felt he was right; SOF wasn't providing him much return. The previous SOCCE commander, CPT Jon White told me that, in March 97 as part of his outbrief to the CG, he took him to a couple of his JCO locations for operations briefings. Upon completion of the briefings, MG Meigs' comment to Jon was that 'it was pretty thin gruel;' i.e. he didn't get anything from the JCOs that he didn't get from other sources."<sup>105</sup>

MND-N commanders also questioned USSF reliability of support because of the weak TACON relationships existing between USSF and MND-N. This interdependence between trust and command relationships is addressed later.

#### A Special Forces Perspective

Likewise, many USSF didn't trust the conventional commanders and staff because they perceived the heavy division (Armored and Mechanized) mentality officers to be inexperienced in a low intensity, peacekeeping environment. They also felt these conventional officers didn't know USSF capabilities and limitations and could put SF soldiers at undue risk because of this lack of knowledge.

Several USSF officers serving in Bosnia stated that they felt most of the mechanized and armored officers in Bosnia had spent their whole careers planning to fight the "ground war" against the Warsaw Pact in Europe and had vindicated their doctrine and training focus in Desert Storm, but they weren't prepared to operate in an "Operations Other Than War" environment. They believed these conventional officers hadn't trained for JTF or peacekeeping operations, didn't understand the complex OOTW environment, and were much less "joint" and "combined" than their light infantry peers. Some of these USSF officers had long associations at a personal, informal level with several of the foreign forces serving in Bosnia and had been told of the allies' reservations concerning U.S. tactics in Bosnia. These, they posit, reflected a "Ninja Turtle suit" mentality of force protection, and a related absence of actual interaction with the people of Bosnia they were supposed to be protecting. As a result, SF personnel did not have confidence

in the conventional leadership's capability to conduct the peacekeeping mission,\* much less control an entity (USSF) so different than the heavy, conventional units to which they were accustomed.<sup>†</sup>

Major Taylor Beattie, the first SOCCE commander in Bosnia, gave an example of why he didn't trust having an inexperienced (in terms of employing SF) conventional commander controlling his forces:

"One time MG Nash called the SAS commander and myself in, told of us of a reported riot and altercation between factions, and asked that we send out a joint JCO-LCE team to see what was happening. This incident had a high possibility of degrading into greater violence, and we only had thin-skinned vehicles. When I noted this vulnerability, and reminded him that he had a mechanized company (with interpreters) within 7 kilometers of the incident site (we were much further away) he stalked off."<sup>106</sup>

In the above incident, both parties came away with different conclusions; MG Nash came away probably thinking "Darn SF, they won't support me again!" MAJ Beattie came away relieved that he had just protected his forces from an overzealous commander. The interchange surfaces a question. Would the CG have had to ask the question if the SOCCE had maintained presence in the CP (presence that the G3 stated earlier they didn't have), and through continuing dialogue developed in the division staff a more clear understanding of SF capabilities? Why did this incident degrade into a harsh no-win meeting engagement that destroyed, rather than built, trust? Additionally, did it possibly impede future openness which may further have worsened mutual trust?

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\* It is possible that part of this difference in viewpoints between the conventional and special forces on force protection and operations in the OOTW environment was due to a difference in their understanding of the military mission in Bosnia. Conventional forces were focused on strict adherence to the military tasks specified in the Dayton Accords directing separation of forces and enforcement of the Accord's provisions while SF was looking ahead to the need for reconciliation between the factions and increased military to civilian contact.

<sup>†</sup> This has obvious interdependence with fit of forces, command relationships, and mission direction. However for ease of understanding, it is addressed here rather than in the interdependence subsection.

Another incident relates to the continuing USSF rationale to not trust conventional officer's judgment - but again lack of communications is the issue. LTC Harry Bakken, the 1<sup>st</sup> AD G2 during IFOR, discussing a request for NATO special forces to observe a terrorist training area, was disappointed when the British led CJSOTF didn't support the mission. He explains:

"One of MG Nash's main concerns with what a certain terrorist group was doing in MND-N. We had identified a terrorist training facility in the NORD-POL brigade sector. I had used National HUMINT collectors to periodically go out and conduct reconnaissance but was never able to get anyone to walk the ridge lines overlooking the site located in the valley. I passed a requirement through the G3 to the ARRC G2 to the CJSOTF in Sarajevo. The operation never took place..."<sup>107</sup>

When asked why he did not use his attached Military Intelligence Brigade Long Range Surveillance (LRS) assets to perform this relatively simple surveillance task, he replied:

"We didn't task LRS to observe the training site because we thought the ridgelines might be mined. U.S. commanders didn't want to put U.S. LRS guys in harm's way. Now that I think of it, that is probably why the British SOF commanders weren't enamored to put their guys up on the ridge line either."

But, he doesn't recall asking any of the British or U.S. SOF leaders in his headquarters for their thoughts on how to accomplish the mission. This is another example where mistrust led to a lack of open communications and a poor outcome.

#### Period of Success in Mutual Trust (Apr -Nov 97)

Mutual trust and the resulting integration of SF with conventional forces improved as the conventional and special forces commanders, staff, and soldiers started to talk more and learned more about each other's missions, capabilities, limitations, and requirements. This maturing of the SF-MND relationship took place over a period of a few months in early 1997 - but only through intense commander and staff interaction.

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\* This is not a USSF issue but simply an example of the conventional - SOF viewpoints on employment. During IFOR the British led CJSOTF would have employed non USSF to execute this mission, if determined feasible and approved.

Mutual trust and comfort with each other developed more quickly in some sectors based on the personalities and previous experiences of the respective commanders and staffs. In other areas, however, it developed more slowly, requiring continual emphasis by the SOCCE commanders to talk with and better support the "customers" - the MND commander and his subordinates.

#### The Conventional Force Perspective

In some areas USSF elements and the local sector battalion or brigade commanders established exceptional working relations early on. LTC Robin Swan, Commander of TF 1-26, the Blue Spaders, in Bosnia from November 1996 through April 1997 recalls:

"I relied on the Zvornik JCO team the most, and always received responsive support. First, TF contact with this team was easy because of geography. Zvornik was only 15 Km east of Camp Dobol. The team chief visited the base camp at least four times weekly and talked either with me or the TF S2/3. Second, Zvornik received most of my attention. I shared my meeting schedule with the JCO team chief, and he fully understood what I was trying to do relative to the police chief, mayor, media, and VRS. Third, communications with the team was reliable enough (we had a Republika Srpska PPT phone line at the base camp) that in event of an emergency, I could contact a team member who in turn could arrange a quick meeting or get a quick message from me to one of the Serb heavy hitters. I believe we had a good relationship with the Zvornik team because we didn't play "I've got a secret". They understood me, I understood them, and we regularly shared information."<sup>108</sup>

The 1<sup>st</sup> ID Division G3, LTC Joe Robinson, remembers the USSF LCE team with the Russian Brigade "saving the day" for 1<sup>st</sup> ID on 11 Nov 96, the day after Transfer of Authority from 1<sup>st</sup> AD:

"At 0500 I was awakened with a report of a firefight in an outlying sector. We had a pretty lean communications network in that sector with no direct communications with the unit in contact. But SF saved the day for us. I still remember two USSF NCOs in our SOCCE making radio contact with the LCE who linked up with the conventional unit to establish communications for us. That was the only way we could communicate during the first big crisis for the 1<sup>st</sup> ID."<sup>109</sup>

LTC Jim Greer, Commander of TF 1-77 in Bosnia from April through October 1997, describes how he gained and maintained full integration with the USSF teams in his sector:

"First, we invited them to come and describe for our staff and commanders what they did and how they did it. We did the same. Then we sat down and brainstormed how we could assist each other. One of the chief methods was sharing intelligence. Our Task Force held a weekly IPB update where we updated our templates, reviewed key events, revised our R&S plan and revised our PIR/SIR. The JCO teams from Brcko, Bjelina, Srebrenic and Modrica (last two until they closed) were regular attendees. That way we had regular crosstalk and knew what each other's focus of activity was for the week. The Brcko team was on our FM net constantly so that both of us could crosstalk and assist each other during daily crisis/activities. We also held weekly civil/military seminars with all three factions, all International Organizations and SFOR in attendance. Our JCO team attended each of these. Anytime our Task Force received a mission and began a deliberate planning cycle, we called in the JCOs. They participated in the planning and preparation for each mission. Where they could be involved without calling higher, we just executed. If either of us felt it necessary to check with the boss, we would both clear the proposed activities with the conventional and SOF leadership. I would say that no day went by that I did not talk to our JCO team(s). We were fully integrated."<sup>110</sup>

But a more deliberate plan to improve mutual trust and mission support needed to be developed to make excellent working relationships at division level and throughout the sector the rule rather than the exception.

#### The Special Forces Perspective


In April 1997, 2-10 SFG rotated into Bosnia relieving 3-10 SFG. LTC Mike Dietrick, commander of 2-10 SFG, augmented the SOCCE-N with additional communications and intelligence personnel, and directed his SOCCE-N commander, Major Steve Damon, to establish a strong working relationship with the G-3 and G-2. He emphasized the absolute requirement of maintaining a positive relationship with the division commanders and staff. LTC Dietrick notes:

"Special Forces Commanders at battalion level and up can "talk" about fostering positive relationships at the working level but it takes junior level leadership and professionalism at the SOCCE and Team level to make it a reality."<sup>111</sup>

With these marching orders, Major Steve Damon changed both the quality of JCO support in the battalion and brigade sectors, and at the division headquarters level with the commander and staff. His underlying theme in bringing about this change was driving home the fact that SF was there to satisfy the "customer" - the MND, and that open communications was key to determining what the "customer" wanted. As depicted in figure 20, he strove to open

## SOCCE-N RECOVERY PLAN

communications and satisfy the customer by improving the SF image with the customer and the quality of their products. He improved the SF image by emphasizing to his troops the absolute requirement of "being team players" through enforcing appearance and conduct standards, and forging strong mutual trust by building strong personal relationships at battalion, brigade, and division level. Additionally, he improved the quality of support by ensuring the JCO teams knew, spoke with, and satisfied their customers - the battalion and brigade commanders.



**Figure 20 - SOCCE-N Plan to improve relations w/ MND-N<sup>112</sup>**

Major Damon's second task was improving the SOCCE relationship with the MND-N division leadership and staff. He recalls:

"At division level, our course seemed pretty clear:

- (1) Integrate into the Division operations to put us in a position to know what they're going to want
- (2) By knowing what the Division wants to know we can make a more relevant JCO report
- (3) And by knowing what they're likely to request of the SOCCE or JCOs, we can figure out a way to make things happen without having to say 'NO, Can't do that, Don't want to do that, and You can't make me do that.' Now, there were times when I had to say NO, or point out that what they were asking for was a doctrinal SOF mission, and we'd really love to do it, but that it represented a change of mission for us. Such a change of mission would require the Division G-3 to request approval through their operational chain of command to our OPCON higher HQ in Sarajevo."<sup>113</sup>

### The Result

LTG Meigs, commander of MND-N at this time, recognized the increase in mutual trust and support by late April. His G3, LTC Joe Robinson, recalls:

"MG Meigs had a meeting in late April with the MND-N staff, JMC chief, and the SOF personnel-- BG Lambert (SOCEUR), COL Heinemann (SOCEUR J3), COL Fuller

(COMCJSOTF), LTC Dietrick (supporting SF battalion commander), and MAJ Damon (our SOCCE commander). The SOF personnel (with my full concurrence) briefed the planned realignment of several teams to better support our requirements. USSF support had drastically improved; they were definitely a "value added force" giving us information that we didn't get through any other source. The meeting was almost a *love in*."<sup>114</sup>

In August 1997, MG David Grange assumed command of 1<sup>st</sup> ID from MG Meigs.

Special Forces qualified and a prior Ranger Regimental Commander with extensive special operations experience, MG Grange knew what he could expect from the USSF. He recalls:

"I got to know the JCOs real well, visited their safe houses, and talked with them. I learned their capabilities. By knowing their capabilities I knew what I could ask of them and what I couldn't."<sup>115</sup>

He also understood how to integrate the Special Forces capabilities into division operations.

"The SOCCE commander was a member of my orders group and had daily contact with me. He ensured synchronization of our JCO teams with Task Force operations. To ensure constant support of the Division Commander's CCIR and AOR objectives, I had weekly contact with the SF battalion commander\* and the SOCCE commander. The SOCCE was totally integrated as a part of the BOS synchronization process..."<sup>116</sup>

Colonel Bruce Hoover, Commander of the CJSOTF in the latter half of 1997

commented on how both USSF and the MND commanders had grown comfortable by late 1997 in their relationship through their continual dialogue and mission execution:

"Everyone wants to do the right thing. Conventional commanders want to employ their assets as they ought to be, without violating mission charters, METLs, and commanders' intents. And the CJSOTF wants to bend over backwards to assist and support MND commanders and COMSFOR alike. There is no animosity nor resentment, only respect for the way each has to operate. MND commanders and staffs routinely defer to SOCCE commanders when it comes to SOF capabilities, as does COMSFOR and his staff to COMCJSOTF at that level."<sup>117</sup>

#### Mutual Trust: Summary

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\* MG Grange noted in the interview with the author that he maintained close contact with the SOCCE's OPCON headquarters (The SF Bn Cdr) to ensure that all desired tasks were in consonance with the overall JCO mission parameters. And where in conflict, the battalion commander was able to coordinate a change in mission.

Trust was the foundation for the integration of USSF with conventional forces. It played a significant role in the determination of the fit of forces, command relationship, and acceptance of mission direction. Trust either opened or closed communications between special forces and conventional forces with the resulting positive or negative effect on efficient joint employment. This degree of openness in communications influenced both elements' propensity to understand each other's needs and capabilities, and arrive at the optimal solution to challenges.

Measure of Merit	Joint Endeavor	Early Joint Guard (Jan - Mar 97)	Later Joint Guard
Competence	+	0	+
Fit of Forces	-	+	+
C2	0	-	0
Direction	0	-	+
<b>Mutual Trust</b>	-	-	+

As the previous observations have borne out, however, trust is based primarily on personalities; for it is people who determine how much to trust one another. In every example, it was an individual who either built or destroyed trust. We will see one more example of the effect of personalities on trust and communication in the next subsection on interdependence.

#### Subsection IIIe. Interdependence

Throughout the preceding sections, we have noted the continuing interdependence between trust and fit of forces, command relationships, and mission direction. This subsection ties together remaining observations on this interdependence before proceeding to the monograph conclusion and recommendations.

Joint Publication 1 states:

"Trust expands the commander's options and enhances flexibility, agility, and freedom to take the initiative when conditions warrant."<sup>118</sup>

Both USSF and the conventional forces initially lacked mutual trust. Unfortunately, this mistrust fed on itself; it was a "do loop." USSF didn't trust conventional forces' control of SF, so to protect themselves from poor direction the SOF leadership recommended and exercised

restrictive command relationships to maintain separation from conventional force operations and control. Thus, when conventional forces, fully occupied in planning, coordinating, and executing a myriad of new and unique tasks with numerous non-divisional players, observed USSF shying away from full cooperation, not wearing the same uniforms, nor undergoing the same hardships, they concluded that the SF didn't want to be team players. This separation and lack of teamwork led to a further breakdown in communications in which neither entity was able to learn of the other's concerns nor provide acceptable recommendations. With this breakdown in communications, both made decisions without consultation. Mutual trust continued its downward spiral. And most importantly, operational effectiveness deteriorated.

Two examples of this interdependence are noteworthy. The first is on the interdependence between competency of mission direction and trust. The second shows the interdependence of trust with fit of forces and command relationships.

Mistrust based on a perceived lack of competence on the part of conventional units to skillfully employ USSF continued during the early period with 1<sup>st</sup> ID. One USSF senior officer operating Bosnia in early 1997 stated the thoughts of other USSF officers at the time:

"The G3 tried to use our men as his: LRRS unit; SR patrols; direct the LCE (liaison coordination element) attached to the Russian Brigade perform independent operations- which would have created significant distrust; message delivery boys for bad news to the FWF(former warring factions) which would have violated their "neutral" position; various tasks associated with PIFWCs (personnel identified for war crimes) which is in direct conflict with the JCO role; and several other inappropriate tasks."<sup>119</sup>

But Captain Ed Haywood, a USSF captain stationed in Bosnia at the same time, questions this harsh judgment, and shows there are two sides to every perception. He states:

"Our relationship difficulties with the G3 were not entirely his fault. Sure, the G3 was a high intensity guy, not likely to win Mr. Congeniality any time soon. But he was in one of the most stressful jobs in the history of the US Army ... G3 of a massive division in the middle of a messy conflict with the mission of "get the impossible done, and take no casualties while doing it!" He had to worry about 4 or 5 ground brigades, aviation, fire support, an enormous logistics tail, 3 factions, refugees, terrorists, and God knows what else. The last thing he needed was us waving TACON in his face every time he asked for help."<sup>120</sup>

LTC Joe Robinson (the targeted G3) reinforces CPT Haywood's view.

"The 1<sup>st</sup> ID, like the 1<sup>st</sup> AD, had all kinds of unique units in its sector - numerous intelligence units, non-divisional units, SOF units, etc. They all wanted to assist us, but in most cases their parent unit continued to want to have some degree of control over them. We had more interpretations of 'TACON' than you could believe. So the command relationship issue with USSF wasn't unique. But that didn't make it any easier to handle. For as the SF officer noted, the last thing I wanted was another 'helper' saying I can't do it when I really needed help."<sup>121</sup>

LTC Robinson's frustration with the limitations of a TACON relationship and its effect on mission accomplishment bring out the second example of interdependence - between trust and the fit of forces and command relationships. The IFOR 1<sup>st</sup> AD G3, LTC Jones, perceived a strong apprehension on the part of SOF leadership of subordinating SF to conventional force commanders:

"I got the feeling dealing with SOF that there is a reluctance to allow SOF to be controlled by non-SOF leaders because they will inevitably misuse them. It seemed to me to be part of an SF culture of sorts. Either because they felt non-SF leaders lacked understanding of SF doctrine and therefore would try to use them to assault hilltops, or another reason I don't really know, but the reluctance is there nonetheless. What is disturbing to me is that it is the same argument made to me by some old tankers 20 years ago on why you should never let an infantryman control tanks."<sup>122</sup>

BG Cherrie, in a separate interview, stated the same perception regarding SOF leadership's reluctance to allow conventional commanders control of USSF:

"My sensing is that anytime conventional forces deal with SOF, it seems like the SOF leadership is thinking, we'd like to give them DS or OPCON to you but you're really not experienced enough to use them. But, for example, when we get PSYOP or Aviation people we're not experienced, but we get a staff officer here who provides the commander with information on what the units capabilities are, how to best use them, whatever."<sup>123</sup>

COL Bruce Hoover, commander of the CJSOTF in the latter half of 1997, indirectly validates BG Cherrie's view:

"In fact, TACON is only a protective measure, giving the SOCCE Cdr, FOB Cdr, and myself veto power for the rare occasion when an MND Cdr might expect something outside our SOF mission boundary. I can count the number of times on one hand where we had to intervene and override a Div Cdr's desires."<sup>124</sup>

This use of TACON as a protective measure, limiting the actual supported commander's authority, surfaces a key issue. If the potential of misuse is small as COL Hoover's states, is the inefficiency and induced friction of a complex command relationship that destroys trust worth the limited payoff of "intervention" authority?

These weak command relationships reinforced the conventional commanders' and staffs' perception that USSF wasn't committed to helping them. Many discussions between MND-N commanders, and senior SOF leaders, included assurances by the SOF leaders that "USSF will support you, don't worry about the command relationship."<sup>\*</sup> But despite assurances by several senior SOF officers during his tenure as CG, 1<sup>st</sup> ID in Bosnia, LTG Meigs, later recalled, that he

"couldn't rely on Special Forces to support his requirements because of the weak TACON relationship he had over Special Forces units conducting JCO and LCE missions."<sup>125</sup>

MG Grange reinforces this interdependence of command relationships and trust. He noted:

"If you don't make them OPCODE, or something close to OPCODE, in a situation like this, then the commanders will not treat them as part of the unit. But you need to train with them, to learn their capabilities in programs like BCTP, JRTC, CMTC, and NTC so you can employ them correctly in operations. So you need both - first you need to train together - and then you need to have enough authority over them so that you feel they are part of the unit. Trust is big..."<sup>126</sup>

As the above examples infer, trust was clearly interdependent with fit of forces, command relationships, and competence in mission direction.

#### Section IV. Conclusion - Assessment of Coherent Joint Operations

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<sup>\*</sup> LTC Cleveland and others reported LTG Schoomaker and BG Lambert assuring MG Meigs that he could count on SF support. Every USSF field grade officer I interviewed told me that command relationships weren't a problem. However, every conventional field grade officer from both 1<sup>st</sup> AD and 1<sup>st</sup> ID stated the opposite, that command relationships were a problem and didn't give MND-N sufficient control over an asset in the sector. The key issue in the TACON vs OPCODE issue is the conventional commander's authority to "task" USSF within mission parameters. This is discussed in the next subsection.

USSF and MND-N operations achieved the “jointness” standard espoused in joint doctrine and Joint Vision 2010 by April 1997. But while the individual component forces were relatively competent throughout the operation, it took until April 1997 to attain efficient joint employment. Efficient employment was attained only after COMSOCEUR facilitated an improved *fit of forces* in January 1997, followed by the operators working out clearer (but unofficial) *command relationships* that resulted in improved *mutual trust*.

These command relationships and mutual trust improved after the USSF realized the MND conventional force commanders were their primary customers, and focused on supporting their needs. Likewise, as conventional commanders saw the benefits of the improving SF support, trust improved, opening communications leading to even greater integration and ultimate value of special forces.

But despite this positive assessment of coherent joint operations in MND-N, these “coherent” operations are still marginal. Imprecise formal command relationships remain. And unclear CJSOTF written mission statements have been verbally overridden by the increasingly customer-oriented CJSOTF, SF SOCCE, and JCO leadership.

Measure of Merit	Joint Endeavor	Early Joint Guard (Jan - Mar 97)	Later Joint Guard
Competence	+	o	+
Fit of Forces	-	+	+
C2	0	-	0
Direction	0	-	+
Mutual Trust	-	-	+
<b>Overall Assessment</b>	<b>o</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>+</b>

## Chapter 6. Conclusion

***“The model for U.S. Army Special Forces in supporting both the Army and the Joint Force Commander should be U.S. Navy SEALs; they support the Fleet and the JSOTF but do not slight the Fleet.”<sup>127</sup>***

*General Wayne A. Downing  
18 January 1998  
(Former Commander in Chief of  
United States Special Operations Command)*

### Section I. Conclusion

Conventional and special forces must improve how they work together. In this age of smaller budgets, force drawdowns, and increasing frequency of “non-conventional” operations such as Bosnia and Haiti, these forces will increasingly be working side by side. They must better integrate their capabilities to efficiently and effectively accomplish the assigned missions. As General (retired) Wayne Downing continually preached, “we must remember that we all wear “U.S. ARMY” over our hearts.”\*

We aren’t there. It still takes far too long to develop the mutual trust and synergy required to exploit the “best fit” of special and conventional forces depicted in Joint Vision 2010. During Joint Guard, which signified the start of significant SF operations in Bosnia, it took over 3 months before SF and conventional forces gained the trust and synergy to work effectively together. If it takes this long in a peacetime operation, how can we expect to gain the immediate trust and operational effectiveness needed in a contingency when bullets are flying and we need each other to survive?

Significant seams remain between special forces and conventional forces. The joint force commander is still not creating the best fit of SOF and conventional forces to achieve

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\* General Downing reminded Army SOF leadership of this in every commander conference during his tenure as CG of USASOC. He dedicated one portion of his command philosophy to this very subject. (The U.S. Army over the heart analogy referred to the U.S. Army tape on the uniform)

desired results because of traditional SOF norms arguing against flexible (and more decentralized) command relationships for special forces. This SOF reluctance is not without good cause; many conventional commanders still do not know SOF capabilities nor how to employ them. This inability to seamlessly integrate special forces by instituting optimal command relationships and providing competent control prevent full trust, hamper open communications, and ultimately degrade the operations of both special forces and the conventional forces.

## Section II. Recommendations

The assessment of SF operations in MND-N prompt recommendations in three DTLOMS\* areas: doctrine, training, and leader development. All of these recommendations support a bottom line stated below:

Special Forces are primarily “Ground” forces, were initially established to support ground operations, and despite their recent inclusion within a joint special operations hierarchy, still have mission obligations to support the ground battle – they still support the Army. As such, Special Forces and the conventional army must better integrate their capabilities to efficiently and effectively accomplish assigned missions.

This bottom line is not in conflict with our joint warfighting doctrine in terms of retreating back toward a “Service Component” dominance over the Joint Commander requirements. Rather, it simply recognizes the predominant role the ground component commander plays in orchestrating the ground battle and the fact that he may require direct control of special forces to exploit their unique capabilities in accomplishing his mission.

### Subsection IIa. Doctrinal Recommendations

TRADOC, more than the SOF community, needs to take the first step to reorient Special Forces back toward supporting both the ground and joint force commanders. SF doctrine,

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\* TRADOC responds to the changes in the strategic landscape, changes in our nation, and changes to our force structure by identifying, developing, and fielding capabilities which are the right combinations of Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organizations, and Materiel to support our Soldiers in accomplishing the missions required of the U.S. Army. See also TRADOC Home Page.

without any doctrinal requirement generation by TRADOC, will continue to focus on developing doctrine focused on only joint SOF requirements and reduce attention on SF responsibilities supporting conventional ground operations.

The U.S. Army needs to demand SF support just as the U.S. Navy demands SEAL support. In the early 80's, The USN saw the potential for reduced SEAL support during the development of USSOCOM. However, unlike the Army hierarchy, they demanded continuing SEAL support to the Fleet while recognizing the "Purple" (Joint) SEAL requirements. USSOCOM and the joint community agreed. The Navy had clearly identified SEAL requirements supporting "pure" navy related operations. Today, over half of the SEAL units habitually support Fleet operations. No SF units habitually support Army operations. The *Army* must currently compete for *Army* Special Forces support in the joint environment whereas Naval commanders have direct support SEALs under their Operational Control on all deployments.

Associated with the realization of a need for more SF support to ground forces is the need for more flexibility in command and support relationships. Army and SF doctrine must stamp out past truisms of shying away from close command relationships of special forces with conventional forces when the situation warrants. Doctrine must identify how different operations may dictate command relationships other than the traditional "TACON" blueprint. These new concepts may require command relationships running the gamut from special forces OPCON to the ground commander, to forces in direct support, to forces operating in a Joint Special Operations Areas having no command or support relationship with conventional forces, to conventional forces placed under the OPCON of SF commanders.

For example, in a conflict the conventional commander may need the surveillance capabilities (and more importantly, the reporting) of an SF team inserted deep beyond the FLOT. But he may not have the means to infiltrate, extract, or resupply the team, nor be able to satisfy

the responsibilities for force protection inherent in an OPCON relationship. In this situation, the conventional commander wants to be able to identify the intelligence requirement (the NAI or TAI), gain mission approval, and ultimately direct the team reporting priorities and receive direct reporting - a clear *Direct Support, not TACON* relationship. At some point during this operation, a link up operation may occur between the forces. For this discrete operation a TACON relationship may be warranted.

A stronger command relationship may be justified in a situation where the ground commander has the capability to plan, conduct, and terminate an SF mission. Recent examples are the JCO and LCE missions in Bosnia where the MND-N commander had total control of the AO in which SF was operating, had force protection responsibilities for the soldiers, and was the actual consumer of their information. If deemed necessary, mission restrictions for these forces may be placed on the gaining commander by the JTF commander to maintain future flexibility. The continuing excuse provided by the SF community - that the commander may not properly employ the SF or not comply with mission parameters does not suffice. *No other Army Branch makes such an assertion.* LTC Mike Jones, the former G3 and CofS of 1<sup>st</sup> AD) said it best:

“Just like past outdated reluctance by armored and infantry commanders to work closely together has been overcome by acceptance of the concept of combined arms, I think we are overdue feeling the same way about SOF. I think with the diverse missions we're getting, the concept of force packaging, we need to adjust from past truisms and get on with doing things the best way, not necessarily the old way. Just like an armor division commander can control stuff that isn't armor, he can in my opinion and when the situation dictates, control SOF. Ensure he has the right staff guys and I believe it will work out very well, and make the SF more effective to boot.”<sup>128</sup>

The third example of a situationally dependent command relationship is where special forces may be conducting a short duration, special operation in a ground commander's AO that is beyond the ground commander's ability to plan, execute, or command or control. In this case, ample justification exists for no command relationship of SF forces - only liaison and coordination to prevent fratricide.

### Subsection IIb. Training Recommendations

Training recommendations include greater SF-conventional force integration training at home stations and in the Combat Training Center program. As Joint Publication 1-0 states, and numerous officers observed in chapter 5, the only way to increase mutual trust and confidence is through complete understanding of each other's capabilities and limitations. The most effective way to attain this understanding and respect is through realistic training. This training should be oriented toward two goals. First, to identify and create the "best fit" of forces, integrating capabilities and capitalizing on strengths in conducting operations. Second, to exercise clear lines of authority and responsibility for employment, where both conventional and Special Forces commanders can learn how to best direct and employ forces. In certain circumstances, this may entail providing the conventional commander much more control of Special Forces assets than has been the case in the past. In others, it may entail providing conventional forces for employment by a Special Forces commander.

### Subsection IIc. Leader Development Recommendations

Our conventional leaders need more institutional instruction in special operations. At CGSOC for example, only three hours of mandatory instruction are provided in the full year's curriculum. Typically, the first time these CGSOC graduates ever confront SF integration issues is during a real world operation or at a CTC. Without any understanding of SF capabilities, limitations, and employment principles, these officers learn (and experiment) on the fly. This unfortunately reinforces (and validates) many SF officer perceptions that conventional officers are not competent to control SF. The lack of conventional officer understanding of SF extends to more senior officers as well. Colonel Hoover previously commented on the COMSFOR relative lack of knowledge on SF capabilities to support his operation. More in depth instruction and discussion of SF employment could possibly have alleviated this lack of knowledge.

## Acronyms

AFSOUTH	Allied Forces South
ARRC	Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps
C3I	Command, Control, Communications, & Intelligence
CAS	Close Air Support
CASEVAC	Casualty Evacuation
CINCSOC	Commander In Chief Special Operations Command
CINCSOUTH	Commander in Chief Southern Command
CJSOTF	Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force
COM	Commander, when used in front of the acronyms of a command, e.g. COMLANDCENT => Commander, LANDCENT
EAF	Entity Armed Forces
FOB	Forward Operating Base (An SF Battalion Headquarters)
FWF	Former Warfighting Factions
GFAP	General Framework Agreement for Peace
IFOR	Implementation Force
ISB	Intermediate Staging Base
JCO	Joint Commission Observer
JMC	Joint Military Commission
LANDCENT	Land Forces Central
LCE	Liaison Coordination Element
LNO	Liaison Officer
MND	Multinational Division
MND-N	Multinational Division - North
MND-SE	Multinational Division - Southeast
MND-SW	Multinational Division - Southwest
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OPCON	Operational Control
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SAS	Special Air Service
SF	Special Forces
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SFG	Special Forces Group
SFOR	Stabilization Force
SOCCE	Special Operations Command and Control Element
SOCEUR	Special Operations Command Europe
SOCIFOR	Special Operations Command IFOR
SOF	Special Operations Forces
TACON	Tactical Control
TCN	Troop Contributing Nations
UKSF	United Kingdom Special Forces
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
USSF	United States Special Forces
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Joint Vision 2010, pg 8.

<sup>2</sup> White House. White House Fact Sheet: The Demining Initiative, Washington, D.C. June 29, 1996 internet access date 22 Jan 98. (Site: <http://www.usis.usemb.se/bosnia/demine2.htm>) and Text: President Clinton Statement on Bosnia Demining Initiative, Lyon, France, June 29, 1996, internet access date 22 Jan 98. (Site: <http://www.usis.usemb.se/bosnia/demine.htm>).

<sup>3</sup> Personal interview with COL Tim Heineman, SOCEUR J3, 26 Nov 97.

<sup>4</sup> National Military Strategy, 1997, Executive Summary and in Characteristics of a Full spectrum Force.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, Chapter on element of Strategy

<sup>6</sup> Joint Vision 2010, pg 34.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, pg 9.

<sup>8</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-0 Doctrine For Joint Operations, 1 Feb 95. Pg II-5.

<sup>9</sup> Joint Vision 2010, pg 31.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid, pg 4.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid, pg 9.

<sup>12</sup> U.S. Special Operations Command, USSOCOM Pub 1 Special Operations in Peace and War, MacDill AFB, FL, 25 January 1996, pg iv.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid, pg 2.

<sup>14</sup> RADM Thomas Stephans, "USSOCOM Command Briefing" (Briefing given to author 17 Dec 97), MacDill AFB, FL.

<sup>15</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-05 Doctrine For Joint Special Operations, Final Coordination, 24 Nov 97. Pg II-3 line 5.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid. pg III-5 line 52.

<sup>17</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 1 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, 10 January 1995, Pg vii.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid, Pg II-6.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid, Pg II-6.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid, Pg II-6.

<sup>21</sup> COL Lawrence Wilkerson, "What Exactly is Jointness?," *Joint Warfighting Quarterly*, Summer 1997, discusses jointness saying "jointness is not greater than the sum of its parts - it is best the sum of its parts." He brings up the essence of jointness as understanding and trust.

<sup>22</sup> Joint Publication 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 23 March 1994.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Both NATO TACOM and NATO TACOM only allow the commander tactical level control such as directing movements and maneuvers for a short or specified duration, or limited to a specific area. See Strategic Studies Institute study, Problems and Solutions in Future Coalition Operations, December 1997, pg 26.

<sup>25</sup> Table extracted from FM 101-5. NATO responsibilities drawn from JP 1-02 and SSI article.

<sup>26</sup> United Nations. Security Council resolution 1031 (1995) on implementation of the Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina and transfer of authority from the UN Protection Force to the multinational Implementation Force (IFOR), 15 December 1995.

<sup>27</sup> NATO. NATO Basic Fact Sheet no 4. NATO's Role in Bringing Peace to the Former Yugoslavia, March 97. (Many of the historical facts found in this section are drawn from this fact sheet.).

<sup>28</sup> NATO. Bosnia Maps. Internet access site, Accessed 15 Dec 97, NATO home page, Web Site: <http://www.nato.int/maps/ifor/ifordep1.gif>.

<sup>29</sup> NATO. NATO Basic Fact Sheet no 11. The NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina April 97, Internet site, Accessed 22 Dec 97. Admiral Joseph Lopez succeeded ADM Smith as CINCSOUTH in July 96 and assumed COMIFOR. General William Crouch (CINCLANDCENT) became COMIFOR in November 1996 when IFOR Headquarters was transferred from CINCSOUTH.

<sup>30</sup> CALL Newsletter 96-8. IFOR had NATO OPCON of MNDs.

- <sup>31</sup> 10<sup>th</sup> SFG Briefing, CW3 John Rikard, 1 Dec 97. UK COL Rose took over from BG Delves during IFOR - specific date unknown. While the UK led the CJSOTF, numerous U.S. officers were on the CJSOTF staff, notably the former COL (now BG) Geoffrey Lambert, current SOCEUR. The U.S. took over leadership of the CJSOTF upon transition to SFOR. At the same time, many of the JCO missions formerly conducted by British Special forces transitioned to U.S. Special Forces.
- <sup>32</sup> NATO. NATO Basic Fact Sheet no 11. The NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina April 97. Internet site, Accessed 22 Dec 97.
- <sup>33</sup> 10<sup>th</sup> SFG Briefing Slide provided by CW3 John Rikard 1 Dec 97.
- <sup>34</sup> United Nations. Security Council resolution 1088 (1996) on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Security Council, 12 Dec 96. Internet site, Accessed 22 Dec 97.
- <sup>35</sup> Task Force Eagle, Mission Statement, Internet access site, accessed 21 Jan 98, Tuzla, Bosnia <http://www.tfeagle.army.mil>.
- <sup>36</sup> 10<sup>th</sup> SFG Briefing Slide provided by CW3 John Rikard 1 Dec 97.
- <sup>37</sup> General William Crouch (CINCLANDCENT) became COMIFOR in November 1996 when IFOR Headquarters was transferred from CINCSOUTH.
- <sup>38</sup> As noted earlier, the U.S. took over leadership of the CJSOTF upon transition to SFOR. At the same time, much of the JCO missions formerly conducted by British Special forces transitioned to U.S. Special Forces.
- <sup>39</sup> NATO. NATO Basic Fact Sheet no 11. The NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina April 97. Internet site, Accessed 22 Dec 97.
- <sup>40</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>41</sup> Preponderance of historical data on force makeup and dates in this section comes from the TF Eagle history site on the internet. Accessed 4 Jan 98. See <http://www.tfeagle.army.mil>.
- <sup>42</sup> CALL Newsletter 96-8. Pg 4.
- <sup>43</sup> CALL Newsletter 96-8. Pg 1.
- <sup>44</sup> The GFAP was the official document signed by the FWF. It was developed and agreed upon in Dayton, Ohio. Also known as the Dayton Peace Agreement.
- <sup>45</sup> NATO Internet Site, General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), Annex 1A, Article VIII, 14 Dec 95, Internet access 22 Jan 98. (Web site: <http://www.nato.int/ifor/gfa/gfa-an1a.htm>).
- <sup>46</sup> An excellent discussion of the JMC structure, mandate, and operations can be found in CALL newsletter in 96-8 and COL David Fastabend's Initial Impressions Report dated May 96.
- <sup>47</sup> Ibid. Pg 4.
- <sup>48</sup> CALL Newsletter 96-8. Pg 4.
- <sup>49</sup> COL Frank Kearney, Personal Interview, 21 Jan 98. COL Kearney was the head of the JMC in MND-N from 6 Jul 97 through 12 Dec 97.
- <sup>50</sup> Task Force Eagle memorandum, Joint Military Commission (JMC) Standard Operating procedures (SOP), Headquarters, Task Force Eagle APO AE 09789 AETV-THZ- JMC, 2 January 1996.
- <sup>51</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>52</sup> COL David Fastabend, Initial Impressions Report, Operation Joint Endeavor, CALL, Ft Leavenworth, KS, May 96., pg 96. Role and mission of the JCOs are examined further in chapter 4.
- <sup>53</sup> Ibid, pg 97. See also the CSI study titled "The Directed Telescope: A Traditional Element of Effective Command," USACGSC, Ft Leavenworth, KS by LTC Gary Griffith, July 1991 for additional background on the directed telescope concept and origins.
- <sup>54</sup> CALL Newsletter 96-8. Pg 23.
- <sup>55</sup> COL David Fastabend, Initial Impressions Report, Operation Joint Endeavor, pg 97. Numerous open source internet articles discuss the more active roles UKSF performed. Two web sites, both accessed 4 Feb 98, are <http://www.ability.org.uk/bosnia.html>. The Ability Project, 19 Latimer Road, Hilldene, Cinderford, Gloucestershire GL14 2PS UK, and <http://www.students.uiuc.edu/~ivetil/gorazde.html>, The Truth About Gorazde, Executive Summary, Task Force On Terrorism And Unconventional Warfare, House Republican Research Committee, U.S. House Of Representatives, Washington, D.C. 20515, May 4, 1994.
- <sup>56</sup> MAJ Taylor Beattie, First SOCCE Cdr with MND-N, Personal Interview, 17 Dec 97.

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- <sup>57</sup> LTC Mike Repass, Interview by author, Ft Leavenworth, KS 14 Jan 98.
- <sup>58</sup> CW3 John Rikard, Slide from 10<sup>th</sup> SFG Briefing on CJSOTF, 1 Dec 97.
- <sup>59</sup> CW3 John Rikard, Slide from 10<sup>th</sup> SFG Briefing on CJSOTF, 1 Dec 97.
- <sup>60</sup> COL David Fastabend, Initial Impressions Report, Operation Joint Endeavor , pg 72.
- <sup>61</sup> Ibid, pg 97.
- <sup>62</sup> Ibid., pg 97.
- <sup>63</sup> LTC Harry Bakken, G2, 1<sup>st</sup> AD, Personal Interview, 6 Jan 97.
- <sup>64</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>65</sup> LTC Mike Jones, Personal email to author, 19 Jan 98.
- <sup>66</sup> MAJ Jim Moller, Personal Interview and papers, 22 Jan 98. (MAJ Moller was the CJSOTF J3 during the early months of IFOR.)
- <sup>67</sup> LTC Art Milak, G5, 1<sup>st</sup> ID, Personal interview, 29 Jan 97.
- <sup>68</sup> LTC Charlie Cleveland, Cdr, 2/10<sup>th</sup> SFG, Personal Interview, 1 Dec 97.
- <sup>69</sup> Memorandum, "Commander's Guidance - Transition to LANDCENT", Headquarters, SOCEUR, 16 October 1996.
- <sup>70</sup> LTC Charlie Cleveland, Personal Interview, 1 Dec 97.
- <sup>71</sup> Memorandum to CG 1<sup>st</sup> ID and COMSOCEUR, Subject: Concept of SF Support, LTC Cleveland, 16 Nov 97.
- <sup>72</sup> CW3 John Rikard, Slide from 10<sup>th</sup> SFG Briefing on CJSOTF, 1 Dec 97.
- <sup>73</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>74</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>75</sup> MG Dave Grange, CG, 1<sup>st</sup> ID, Personal Interview, Ft Leavenworth, KS, 29 Jan 98.
- <sup>76</sup> COL Bruce Hoover, Personal email to author, 2 March 1998.
- <sup>77</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>78</sup> Sidney Shachnow, "Intercultural Communication: The Need for Conceptual Skills," Special Warfare Magazine, USAJFKSWCS, Ft Bragg, NC. February 1993, pg. 20. (MG Shachnow at the time was the Commanding General of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School - the Special Forces training center)
- <sup>79</sup> Ibid, pg. 20.
- <sup>80</sup> Frank Bohle, "Army Special Forces: A Good Fit for Peace Operations," USAWC, 12 Apr 97, pg 5.
- <sup>81</sup> Carl W. Stiner, "Special Operations Forces: Strategic Potential for the Future," Special Warfare Magazine (May 1993), pg 4.
- <sup>82</sup> Mike Jones, LTC, G3, 1<sup>st</sup> AD during IFOR. Email response to author. 19 Jan 98.
- <sup>83</sup> BG Stan Cherrie, Personal Interview by author 18 Feb 98.
- <sup>84</sup> Jeff Rapp, LTC, Email response, 29 January 1998.
- <sup>85</sup> BG Cherrie, Personal Interview, 18 Feb 98.
- <sup>86</sup> BG Cherrie, Personal Interview, 18 Feb 98. MG Nash also stated that he was disappointed in USSF failure to support his situational assessment requirements on 4 Feb 97 during a SOF doctrinal overview briefing conducted as part of the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) warfighting seminar at Fort Leavenworth.
- <sup>87</sup> CW3 John Rikard, Quoted in a 10<sup>th</sup> SFG Briefing on Bosnia. 1 Dec 97.
- <sup>88</sup> 1<sup>st</sup> ID OPORD 96-29.
- <sup>89</sup> JCS Joint Publication 1-02.
- <sup>90</sup> FM 100-5, June 1993, Pg 2-5.
- <sup>91</sup> Ibid, Pg 2-7.
- <sup>92</sup> BG Cherrie, Personal interview, 18 Feb 98.
- <sup>93</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, "Die wichtigsten Grundsätze des Kriegsführens....," quoted in Peter Paret's introductory essay "The Genesis of *On War*" in Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, translated by Peter Paret and Michael Howard (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), 17. As quoted in Joint Publication 1-0 dated 10 January 1995, pg I-2.
- <sup>94</sup> Joint Pub 1, Pg viii.
- <sup>95</sup> Per author discussion with COL Clint Ancker (Chief of Corps and Division Doctrine at Fort Leavenworth KS - CDD is the OPR for the Army FM 101-5 which describes command relationships) and

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Strategic Studies Institute study, Problems and Solutions in Future Coalition Operations, December 1997, pg 26.

<sup>96</sup> MG Meigs in conversation with MAJ Steve Damon per interview with Damon 1 Dec 97.

<sup>97</sup> LTC Mike Detrick, Personal email to author, 17 Feb 98.

<sup>98</sup> COL Bruce Hoover, Personal email to author, 2 March 1998.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid. 20 Mar 98.

<sup>100</sup> LTC Charlie Cleveland, Cdr, 2/10<sup>th</sup> SFG, Personal Interview, 1 Dec 97.

<sup>101</sup> Jones, 19 Jan 98.

<sup>102</sup> Rapp, 29 Jan 98.

<sup>103</sup> Damon, 1 Dec 97.

<sup>104</sup> CPT Jon White, Memorandum to author, 16 Feb 98.

<sup>105</sup> Damon, Email to author, 13 Feb 98.

<sup>106</sup> Taylor Beattie, Personal interview. 17 Dec 97.

<sup>107</sup> Harry Bakken, Personal Interview. 6 Jan 98.

<sup>108</sup> Robin Swan, Email, 13 Feb 98.

<sup>109</sup> LTC Joe Robinson, G3, 1<sup>st</sup> ID, Phone conversation with author, 19 Feb 98.

<sup>110</sup> Jim Greer, LTC, Cdr of TF 1-77, Personal email to author, 19 Feb 98

<sup>111</sup> Mike Dietrick, LTC, Cdr 2-10 SFG, Personal email to author, 17 Feb 98.

<sup>112</sup> Steve Damon, Briefing slide on SOCCE Operations. 1 Dec 97.

<sup>113</sup> Steve Damon, Personal email to author. 13 Feb 98.

<sup>114</sup> LTC Joe Robinson, G3, 1<sup>st</sup> ID, Phone conversation with author, 19 Feb 98.

<sup>115</sup> MG David Grange, Personal interview with author, 29 Jan 98.

<sup>116</sup> MG David Grange, Article in the SF Association Newsletter, the Drop. Fall 97.

<sup>117</sup> COL Bruce Hoover, Personal email to author, 2 March 1998.

<sup>118</sup> Joint Pub 1, Pg II-6.

<sup>119</sup> Personal email to author, Anonymous by decision of author, 12 Feb 98.

<sup>120</sup> Personal email to author, Anonymous by decision of author, 15 Feb 98.

<sup>121</sup> LTC Joe Robinson, G3, 1<sup>st</sup> ID, Phone conversation with author, 19 Feb 98

<sup>122</sup> Jones, Email, 19 Jan 98.

<sup>123</sup> BG Cherrie, Personal interview. 18 Feb 98.

<sup>124</sup> Hoover, Personal email to author, 2 March 1998.

<sup>125</sup> LTG Meigs was laudatory of SF support in terms of the JCO mission but felt that he couldn't rely on continued SF support due to the possibility of SF being detached by IFOR for other missions. The monograph will address this concern in detail in later chapters. LTG Meigs' comments were made 29 Oct 97 to AOASF students at Fort Leavenworth in conjunction with an AAN briefing.

<sup>126</sup> MG Grange, Personal interview with author.

<sup>127</sup> Wayne Downing, GEN (ret), Personal email to the author commenting on the need for USSF to better support the Army in addition to performing their joint SOF responsibilities, 18 Jan 98. This quote in no way purports to compare the competence or effectiveness of Army Special Forces with Navy SEALs.

<sup>128</sup> Jones, Email, 19 Jan 98.

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